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Abstract 
Public support is essential for the survival of a democratic regime. While support for 
democracy indicates the extent to which democratic rule is massively accepted, satisfaction 
with democracy evaluates the performance of the democratic regime. Even though the 
citizens’ satisfaction with democracy is increasing in Latin America, there are still many 
dissatisfied democrats in the region. If dissatisfaction with the democratic regime corrode the 
regime support, this can be crucial for the legitimacy, and thus the survival of democracy. 
Using survey data from 18 Latin American countries combined with contextual information, 
this thesis finds that trust in democratic institutions and perception of economic situation have 
the strongest positive effects on citizens’ satisfaction with democracy in Latin America. This 
is consistent with the results from previous research on satisfaction with democracy in 
Europe. In addition, this thesis reveals that the attitudes towards democracy in Latin America 
are also affected by the ‘political culture’ in the region. Societal problems such as corruption 
and economic inequality have an impact on citizens’ satisfaction with democracy.  
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1 Introduction 
During the last few years, several of the Latin American countries have celebrated the 
bicentenary of their independence. More than 200 years of political jumble has ended in a 
democratic wave over the region. Entering into the twenty-tens, Latin American citizens’ 
overall satisfaction with democracy is higher than it has been in years.  
The last century, Latin America has been struggling back and forth between autocracy—
military junta or dictatorship—and democracy. It has been argued that democratic breakdown 
is no longer an impending threat in Latin America (Schneider 2008:1). The democratically 
elected governments can now “focus on solving social and economical problems rather than 
being busy trying to keep the military in the barracks” (ibid.). Others have argued that the 
democratic transitional process in the world has come to a halt, and have predicted that a 
‘reverse wave’ of democracy might be underway (Diamond, 2008).  
To see if the old alternatives to democracy in the Latin American region are permanently 
replaced or just in abeyance (Whitehead 1992:148), it is necessary to investigate the attitudes 
towards democracy of the citizens of Latin America. Most research on how popular adherence 
to democracy is sustained is based on countries or regions in the world with long democratic 
traditions. This thesis seeks to contribute to the existing literature by identifying trends and 
tendencies that can explain attitudes towards democracy in a developing part of the world. 
More specifically, this thesis asks which factors influence satisfaction with democracy in 
Latin America. No country or continent can be studied and understood in isolation from other 
parts of the world. To answer the research question, I will therefore use results from former 
studies on satisfaction with democracy in Europe. A cross-regional comparison can reveal if 
certain factors are universally predominant. Because of different democratic experiences in 
the two regions, I do expect there to be certain region-specific factors as well. 
This introduction gives a brief overview of the democratization process in Latin America. I 
will discuss different scholars understanding of how ‘satisfaction with democracy’ is used as a 
question in opinion surveys, and clarify the overlap and the differences between the two 
concepts: Satisfaction with democracy and support for democracy. Previous research will be 
reviewed in the introduction. Chapter two presents a long-term perspective on satisfaction 
with democracy in Latin America. Socio-economic and political experiences will be used as a 
backdrop in formulating the hypotheses. Chapter three presents the data used in this thesis and 
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the method applied to solve the research question. Further, a discussion of the advantages and 
challenges to quantitative research in general, and the multilevel model in particular will 
follow. The key variables will also be operationalized in chapter three. In chapter four the 
results from the multilevel analysis will be presented and interpreted. The analysis will also be 
performed by using a standard Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression in order to see the 
advantages and disadvantages of the two methodological approaches in regards to my 
investigation. Finally the findings will be summed up with suggestions for further research in 
the concluding remarks of chapter five. 
1.1 Democracy as the golden standard 
Democracy, even with its flaws and differences, is considered the most fair and justifiable 
regime in the world today. Democracy has complex demands (Sen 1999:9). Voting and 
respect for election results is essential, but it also requires the protection of liberties and 
freedoms, respect for legal entitlements, and the guaranteeing of free discussion and 
uncensored mass media (Sen 1999:10). “For many in the West at least, democracy and 
democratic values are not only key indicators of political legitimacy but also primary 
mediators of meaning. That is to say, the values, principles and experience of democracy 
profoundly shape both the perception and judgment of action in the political world” 
(MacMillan 2005:2).  
The transition to democracy began relatively late in many of the Latin American countries. 
The democratization process in the world has been divided into three ‘waves’ (Huntington, 
1991), where several of the Latin American countries are categorized as third wave 
democracies
1
. The democratization of these countries occurred between 1974 and 1990. The 
third wave democracies have in some cases resulted in fragile democracies. This implies that 
there are certain components which would be present in more advanced liberal democracies 
that are absent in the Latin American democracies (Calleros 2009:1). These components are 
typically the division of powers and a system of checks and balances, transparency in political 
and economic processes and a minimum of social welfare. I will come back to these 
components in the discussion of regional experiences in the next chapter. 
                                                 
1
 These countries are the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and 
Panama. The second wave democracies in Latin America—Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador and Peru—
experienced a ‘second reverse’ and therefore fall into the category of third wave democracies as well 
(for an elaboration of the democratization development, see “The Third Wave” by Huntington, 1991). 
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It has been argued that the presidential system of Latin America is less democratic than a 
parliamentarian system, or that this system is partly what hinders the components mentioned 
above to be established
2
. In several Latin American countries, the desirability of 
presidentialism was the subject of intense political debate for some decades
3
. The critics 
pointed at the dominance of the presidents, particularly combined with the ineffectual system 
of checks and balances in the region (ibid.). The presidential systems are often treated as 
homogenous systems, which is an unfortunate generalization (Mainwaring and Shugart 
2002:20). The presidential regime of countries with longer democratic experiences in the 
region (i.e. Uruguay and Chile) is often left out when discussing the negative impact of such 
regimes. Anyhow, in presidential systems, the presidents do have the absolute control of the 
executive power for a set period of time (Mainwarning 1990:165). 
Since the 1980s, the debate has evolved around whether or not the presidential system were 
responsible for the breakdown of democracies in the past (Mainwaring and Shugart 2002:12)
4
. 
The democratic breakdown was blamed on the presidential system partly because in such a 
system, there were barely any existing mechanisms for replacing a president who had lost the 
popularity in the society and support in the legislature. “The president may be incapable of 
pursuing a coherent course of action because of congressional opposition, but no other actor 
can resolve the problem within the democratic rules of the game. Consequently (in many 
cases), a coup appears to be the only means of getting rid of an incompetent or unpopular 
president” (Mainwarning 1990:165).  
Political scientist Juan Linz, who launched the debate in 1984, supported the argument that 
the presidential system is not favorable in creating stable democracies (Linz, 1994). This was 
partly because in a presidential system “the winner takes it all” (ibid.).  
                                                 
2
 The most striking difference between the two systems is how the chief executive is elected. In a 
presidential system, the president is both chief executive and head of state, elected independently of 
the legislature. In a parliamentarian system the chief executive or the prime minister is not chosen by 
the people, but by the legislature.  
3
 Latin American scholars were more concerned with the political institutions in the 1940s and 1950s 
than in the subsequent decades, until the 1980s (Mainwarning 1990:159). 
4
 This was the first time in decades in which a discussion took place as to whether a parliamentary 
system should replace the presidential system. In the end of the 1980s- beginning of 1990s, there was 
an attempt to establish semi-presidential systems in Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, Chile and Bolivia. 
Even if the replacement of systems was suggested by the congresses of the countries, the presidential 
system was preferred in all the countries mentioned when it came time to decide (Mainwaring and 
Shugart 2002:12-13). 
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Hyper-presidentialism
5
 is one such scenario where the ‘winner takes it all’. “Hyper-
presidentialism occurs when elected presidents try to take the law into their hands, ignore 
constitutional limits, supersede the Congress and the courts, and use every possible trick to 
prolong their stay in office. Hyper-presidentialism directs a grave assault on democracy, 
because it is a challenge to political institutions coming from none other than the commander 
and spender in chief” (Corrales and Altschuler, 2009). The recurrence of hyper-
presidentialism indicates that the dominance of the president in the regimes of Latin America 
can be a hindrance for the establishment and functioning of democratic institutions. This, as 
well as increased political instability, controversial reelection procedures and lack of 
confidence in party systems, can cause the support for the regime to diminish (Filgueira et.al 
2005:94). Low levels of support can be a crucial problem, as the functioning and maintenance 
of democratic systems are closely linked with what and how people think about democratic 
governance (Lipset 1959:86-105). This thesis therefore seeks to find the factors that can have 
an influence on ‘what and how’ people think about the democratic governance in the Latin 
American region. 
1.2  Democratic support and satisfaction 
There are two approaches to measuring attitudes towards democracy. One is observing 
support for democracy, another is to observe respondents satisfaction with democracy.  
David Easton`s concept of political support has been a reference point in clarifying the 
differences between support for democracy and satisfaction with democracy. Easton (1975) 
distinguishes between specific and diffuse support. Specific support is ‘object-specific’ in the 
sense that it is a response to the authorities based on the evaluation of the incumbent 
government`s general performance, and their ability to meet the public demands (Easton 
1975:437-438). This form of political support can be interpreted to be satisfaction with 
democracy. Diffuse support, is a deeply embedded set of attitudes towards politics and the 
operation of the political system (Easton 1975:444), or in this instance, support for 
democracy.  
Support for democracy can be been measured as an evaluation of whether democracy is the 
only legitimate regime, or if an authoritarian regime could be considered as an alternative 
                                                 
5
 Hyper-presidentialism is “a President’s government” or an accumulation of power by the president 
(Rossi and Böhmer, 2004).  
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under certain circumstances (Latinobarometro
6
). Support for democracy is thus an indication 
of the extent to which democratic rule is massively accepted (Moreno 2003:271). Satisfaction 
with democracy is tied to the performance of the regime, and is an evaluation of the actual 
democracy, not taking other alternatives into consideration.  
In designing ideal type models to explain the rationality behind regime preferences, political 
scientists Sarsfield and Echegaray (2005) used satisfaction with democracy to explain a cost-
benefit analysis of regime preference; a classical utility rationality approach
7
. I have used 
their model layout to sum up the results I found in a cross-tabulation on support for, and 
satisfaction with democracy in Latin America in 2009: 
Table 1.0: Sarsfield and Echegaray`s model layout for utility reasons in regime preference, measured by degree 
of satisfaction with democracy. All estimates are based on Latinobarometro, poll taken in 2009. 
  Satisfied with democracy Not satisfied with democracy 
Preference for 
democracy: 
75 % 
  
= (1) Utilitarian ‘untested’ 
democrats (35.4 % of 
sample) 
55.7 % 
  
= (3) Genuine ‘proven’ 
democrats (29.4 % of sample) 
Indifference: 11.5 % 
 
= (2) Genuine ‘proven’ 
authoritarians (11.8 % of 
sample) 
24.6 % 
 
= (4) Utilitarian ‘untested’ 
authoritarians (23.4 % of 
sample) 
For 
authoritarianism: 
13.5 % 
 
19.7 % 
 
Total 100 %     100 %     
(n= 19318) (8626)     (9649)     
       
The sample is based on respondents from 18 Latin American countries in 2009.  N= 20204 (Valid N= 
19318). The response categories of satisfaction with democracy have been reduced to two categories 
for this analysis. ‘Satisfied with democracy’ aggregates ‘very satisfied’ and ‘fairly satisfied’, while 
‘Not satisfied with democracy’ aggregates ‘not very satisfied’ and ‘not satisfied at all’. The ‘don`t 
know’ and ‘no answer’ categories are excluded for this analysis.  
Wording of the support categories is as follows. Preference for democracy: Respondents that have 
answered ‘democracy is preferable to any other kind of government’. Indifference: Respondents that 
have answered ‘for people like me, it doesn`t matter whether we have a democratic or a non-
democratic regime’.  This group has also been referred to as the ‘alienated’ (Linz and Stepan 
1996:227). For authoritarianism: Respondents that have answered ‘under some circumstances, an 
authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one’ (Source: Latinobarometro). 
                                                 
6
 Latinobarometro is the opinion survey on which I will base my investigation (the 2009 poll). See 
chapter 3, part 3.1 (Data). 
7
 The three ideal type models were: The “classical utility rationality” based on cost-benefit analysis, 
the “means-to-an-end instrumental rationality” and the “axiological rationality” model (see Sarsfield 
and Echegaray 2005:153-173). 
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The classical utility rationality approach is made up of two groups: Satisfied democrats – the 
utilitarian democrats (1), and not satisfied authoritarians – the utilitarian authoritarians (4) 
(Sarsfield and Echegaray 2005:159). The utilitarians (1+4) constitute more than half of the 
respondents in the total sample (58.8 %). Utilitarians demand that the pursuit of human 
welfare, or utility, be done impartially for everyone in the society. Human welfare can be 
defined as “the greatest happiness of the greatest number” (Kymlicka 2002:11). These groups 
have also been called ‘untested’ in the table, since one cannot be sure that the respondents that 
constitute these groups would support a democratic regime if they were not satisfied (1) or an 
authoritarian regime if they were indeed more satisfied (4). Their subjective state of 
satisfaction with democracy is the indicator of what utility individuals perceive in the current, 
existing regime (Sarsfield and Echegaray 2005:158).   
The genuine ‘proven’ democrats (3) are supporters of democracy. They find democracy 
preferable to any other kind of government, even though they do not consider themselves 
satisfied. The proven democrats are citizens that would still be democrats even though they 
are not satisfied with what goes under the ‘label’ of democracy in their country (Kotzian 
2011:24).  
The genuine ‘proven’ authoritarians (2) are respondents that are satisfied with the current 
regime, but are indifferent to whether the ruling regime is a democratic one, or an 
authoritarian alternative. This group is a rather small fraction of the total sample (11.8 %), but 
as the table shows, there is approximately 20 % higher acceptance of authoritarian regimes 
amongst respondents that are not satisfied with democracy
8
. Dissatisfaction with democracy 
can thus result in indifference to the regime, or worse, it can generate doubts or rejection of 
democracy all together (Sarsfield and Echegaray 2005:159).  
There is a mutual relationship between support for—and satisfaction with—democracy. The 
survival of democracy depends on public support. Democracy can still survive without 
satisfied respondents, but dissatisfaction might eventually corrode regime support.  
Understanding how popular adherence to democracy is sustained can therefore be essential to 
the survival of democracy (Sarsfield and Echegaray 2005:153). Authorities will be evaluated 
                                                 
8
 Within the ‘satisfied’ aggregate, 75 % of the respondents supports democracy, but within the ‘not 
satisfied’ aggregate only 55.7 % of the respondents supports democracy.  
19 
 
according to the extent to which the citizens perceive their demands to have been met. These 
perceptions, which determine the citizens’ specific political support, can be significant for the 
stability or change of a system (Easton 1975:438).  
 
1.2.1 Conceptualization and framework for the measures 
What the variable satisfaction with democracy measures in a survey poll is highly disputed 
amongst different scholars. “We expect that ‘satisfaction with democracy’ cannot but be 
extremely hard to predict; since it is driven by individual interpretations on both sides of the 
‘discrepancy’: what democracy should look like, and the way it works” (Wagner et.al. 
2003:6).  
There has been a tendency in previous research to raise questions about the conceptualization 
of satisfaction with democracy without putting forward any further discussion on the topic. 
Some scholars (Linde and Ekman) criticize the way satisfaction with democracy is used in 
comparative politics to measure support for the principles of democracy. Their argument is 
that the concept only reflects the people’s support for the way the democratic regime works in 
practice (2003:391). One explanation to this is that citizens of new regime—for instance Latin 
America—have little understanding of democratic ideals, but strong feelings about the 
performance of the new regime, especially in comparison to the past (Mishler and Rose 
2001:304-306).  
Other scholars (Wagner et.al.) have a mixed approach, where the concept does not necessarily 
indicate support for the principles of democracy in general, but still link satisfaction with the 
current government to the workings of a democracy (2003:2). Another such mixed approach 
is that the outcome for the variable satisfaction with democracy is connected to the 
respondents’ political knowledge (Canache et. al 2001: 520). That is to say that the 
respondents with high knowledge levels will tie satisfaction to support for democracy as a 
form of government, while ‘less informed’ respondents will tie satisfaction to support for 
incumbent authorities (ibid.). Yet other scholars argue that satisfaction with democracy is an 
indicator of actual system support, and not coterminous with support for the incumbent 
government (see Anderson et.al, 1997).  
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Finally, some scholars go so far as to say that variables measuring such ambiguous concepts 
should be all together excluded from future questionnaires, since the interpretation cannot be 
consistent. The advantage of asking the same question in future surveys is that the repetition 
makes it possible to observe tendencies in a long-term perspective. The possible 
misinterpretation of the term satisfaction will be repeated, but the consistency and continuity 
of what is measured will persist.  
Does the variable then represent satisfaction with the principles of democracy, or satisfaction 
with the government in power? I believe it is a combination of the two. The ‘true’ meaning of 
the concept remains ambiguous.  
1.2.2 What is satisfaction with democracy? 
Satisfaction is an abstract term and the conceptualization is important for the validity of the 
concept (Adcock and Collier 2001:531). The background concept for the Latinobarometro 
poll taken in 2009 was to determine if the democracies of Latin America have matured. This 
was in light of two extraordinary events, the economic crises in 2008 and the coup d’état in 
Honduras in June 2009. Political scientist Jon Elster (1987:43) wrote that “Some mental and 
social states appear to have the property that they can only come about as the by-product of 
actions undertaken for other ends. They can never, that is, be brought about intelligently or 
intentionally, because the very attempt to do so preclude the state one is trying to bring 
about”. Satisfaction with democracy can be said to be one such by-product, which only can be 
established by an overall and usually longer-term support for the principles of democracy and 
conviction through action by those representing the regime. This is the equivalent to Easton`s 
specific political support which is the “satisfactions that members of a system (e.g. 
democracy) feel they obtain form the perceived outputs and performances of the political 
authorities” (1975:437). Satisfaction with democracy is a good measure of perceptions 
concerning the effectiveness of democracy in dealing with economic, social and political 
problems (Lagos 2001:141) and can thus be an indication of how mature the respondents find 
the democracy in their country. 
Satisfaction with democracy as such is not an indication of how democratic the countries are. 
It is important to note that the investigation in this thesis is about the factors that can influence 
the respondents’ satisfaction with democracy. The thesis does not discuss the presence of 
democracy in the Latin American countries.  
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1.3 Previous research 
Satisfaction with democracy is probably the most popular and universal question regarding 
attitudes towards democracy in public opinion surveys. All the existing worldwide surveys 
contain this question, which facilitates comparison. There is extensive literature available on 
the matter, with different focus or areas of investigation. I will give a brief introduction to the 
previous research on satisfaction with democracy that has inspired and served as a basis for 
this particular thesis. 
Anderson and Guillory`s article Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy: A 
Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems (1997), uses the 
Eurobarometer poll of 1990 to compare 11 European countries
9
, asking if political institutions 
affect citizen satisfaction with democracy. The article contributes to the investigation of 
satisfaction with democracy by incorporating the country’s political context to the explanation 
of public support for, and satisfaction with, democracy. Their results show that satisfaction 
with democracy is affected by the respondents’ status as a part of the political majority or 
minority; referring to whether they are amongst the winners or losers in electoral contests. 
This is influenced by how the democratic institutions treat those in the political majority and 
those in minority, combined with individual-level variables such as evaluation of economic 
performance and political interest (1997:66-77).  
Linde and Ekman are testing the winner/loser hypothesis in a Central and East European 
context, including countries with shorter democratic experiences. They use Central and 
Eastern Eurobarometer from 1997 on ten additional European countries
10
 and conclude that 
Anderson and Guillory`s findings of the importance of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ is indeed valid 
(2003:404). They add that the pattern is related to long-term experience with democracy, 
since the share of ‘satisfied losers’ is significantly higher in Western Europe than in Eastern 
Europe (Linde and Ekman 2003:403).  
A critical study on the winner/loser gap has been conducted by Blais and Gelineau (2007). 
They question the causal relation of the electoral outcome and the levels of satisfaction with 
                                                 
9
 The Eurobarometer poll from 1990 has an N=12, the 12 member states of the European community 
at the time. Anderson and Guillory have excluded Luxembourg because of small sample size. 
Respondents from Northern Ireland have also been excluded due to the special political situation in the 
area (Anderson & Guillory 1997:69-70).    
10
 The countries involved in the study was Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia (Linde and Ekman 2003: 404). 
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democracy. By using the 1997 Canadian federal election panel study, they find that the 
winners of electoral contests are more satisfied with democracy also before the election, and 
add the effect of the electoral cycle in explaining positive attitudes towards democracy. 
Another article on the subject by Wagner, Dufour and Schneider: Satisfaction not 
Guaranteed- Institutions and Satisfaction with democracy in Western Europe (2003) also uses 
the Eurobarometer poll of 1990, N=12 (as Anderson and Guillory, 1997), but have a different 
view upon which factors play a role in determining the respondents satisfaction. First, they 
introduce their article by placing satisfaction with democracy on equal terms as satisfaction 
with the ‘constitution in operation’ in their investigation (2003: 2-3), which is an often 
debated entry in this field of investigation (see discussion part 1.2 of this chapter). Secondly, 
they argue that group membership as a measure of social capital is a positive contributor to 
citizen satisfaction, while income inequality can be detrimental to the people’s opinion on 
democracy. They also tested the influence of trust, but found the results to be ambiguous 
(2003:4).  
Alejandro Moreno (2003) focuses on the negative relation between corruption and democratic 
attitudes in his article Corruption and Democracy: A Cultural Assessment. The study is based 
on data from successive waves of the World Value Surveys. He inquires as to the extent of 
which permissiveness towards corrupt practices reflect cultural factors. The article shows that 
permissiveness towards corruption is strongly and negatively correlated with support for 
democracy and trust. Latin America is used as an example of a political culture where 
corruption has played an important role in political competition. With new democratic 
governments in Latin America, the battle against corruption has been intensified. Moreno is 
directed towards finding out if democratization reduces corruption. He finds that this is not 
the case in countries where the mass public is likely to accept some corrupt practices. In such 
cases, corrupt practices are attached to the political culture and inherited practices from 
former less-democratic regimes. The justification of corrupt practices in Latin America has 
been found to be higher at the end of the 1990s, than in the beginning of the same decade 
(Moreno 2003:274). The article emphasizes the negative effect of corrupt practices on 
economic development and the emergence and survival of democratic institutions (Moreno 
2003:265).  
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Marta Lagos is one of few investigators concentrating on the Latin American continent
11
. In a 
series of articles (2001, 2003) she discusses how Latin Americans view democracy. In her 
article: “A Road with no Return?” (2003), she argues that satisfaction with democracy is 
negatively affected by social inequalities, corruption and poor political performance. Lagos 
emphasizes that satisfaction with democracy in Latin America is highly sensitive to variation 
in economic performance and alternation in power.  
I will use the approach of these research articles in the attempt of explaining attitudes towards 
democracy in Latin America.  
1.3.1 The contribution of the thesis 
Previous research has focused on various indicators as prerequisites for satisfaction with 
democracy. An observation from worldwide studies on satisfaction with democracy is that the 
factors of significance are highly related to the context in which it is presented. Latin America 
is an interesting field of investigation. The political situation of the continent is vibrant and 
consistently changing. However, there are few of the international surveys that include more 
than a handful of the Latin American countries simultaneously.  
Most of the research has evolved around Europe and consolidated democracies. The findings 
are based on empirical evidence from advanced industrial states. There is no reason to expect 
that the factors affecting citizen satisfaction and dissatisfaction in wealthy and well 
established democratic states would be the same as in not so wealthy countries with briefer 
experiences with democratic practices (Nevitte and Kanji 2003:158).  
All regimes are dependent upon public support for survival. If the findings in this thesis can 
contribute to understanding which factors are favorable or detrimental to sustaining a 
democratic regime, can this be useful for policy-makers in young or unconsolidated 
democracies, in yet other parts of the world.
                                                 
11
 Marta Lagos is also the founding director of Latinobarometro survey. 
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2 Regional experiences and 
expectations 
This chapter will take a look at satisfaction with democracy in Latin America from the first 
poll of the Latinobarometro survey in 1996 to the latest poll in 2009
12
 (part 2.1). In 
formulating the hypotheses, the differences between the countries and the variations from one 
year to another will be discussed and combined with findings in previous research on 
satisfaction with democracy. Socio-economic conditions will be discussed and formulated 
into hypotheses in part 2.2, followed by political conditions in part 2.3, and contextual 
conditions in part 2.4. 
2.1 A long-term perspective 
The turbulent political history of the Latin American countries and the frequent changes in the 
political landscape has had an impact on citizens’ attitudes towards democracy. Satisfaction 
with democracy has generally been low in Latin America. However, the statistics show that it 
is increasing. In 2009, as compared to the previous five years, we see a trend where citizens 
with varying degrees of satisfaction and dissatisfaction express greater overall levels of 
satisfaction with democracy. This implies that there is not just a general increase in 
satisfaction with democracy, but also a shift towards more satisfied citizens. 
In the Latinobarometro poll taken in 2008, Uruguay was the only country with a majority of 
satisfied respondents. Venezuela and the Dominican Republic followed closely with a rather 
even number of satisfied and dissatisfied respondents, but the remaining countries still had a 
high number of dissatisfied respondents. The 2009 poll shows a far more positive trend: 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 The 2009 survey poll was the latest addition available when I gathered data for the thesis.  
25 
 
 
Figure 2.0: Percentage of satisfied versus dissatisfied respondents in the Latin American countries in 2009 
 
 (*Dom. Rep = Dominican Republic. Source: Latinobarometro, 2009). 
Uruguay still has the absolute highest proportion of satisfied citizens, while Costa Rica and 
Panama are following closely. El Salvador, the Dominican Republic and Chile have a 
majority of satisfied citizens while Bolivia and Venezuela have more satisfied citizens than 
dissatisfied citizens. This is a remarkable leap for satisfaction with democracy in the region. 
2.1.1 Satisfaction with democracy in Latin America: 1996-2009 
A long-term perspective can be useful for detecting tendencies within the different countries, 
and link the results to important historical milestones. The changes from year to year and the 
variation between countries will be basis for reviewing experiences in the region. The 
approaches to explaining the ups and downs in the satisfaction with democracy could be 
inexhaustible. I shall devote my attention to the socio-economic and political conditions that 
were emphasized in the previous research on satisfaction with democracy in Europe and Latin 
America. 
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Table 2.0: Mean satisfaction with democracy, on a scale from 0 (not at all satisfied) to 100 (very satisfied). The 
countries are placed in alphabetic order. 
Country 1996 1997 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Argentina 41 43 50 48 28 18 40 40 40 49 39 39 41 
Bolivia 35 40 44 34 29 35 32 30 33 45 45 40 51 
Brazil 29 29 34 27 33 33 35 36 31 42 38 42 48 
Chile 37 42 38 40 34 37 39 45 47 45 42 42 53 
Colombia 28 42 33 37 28 28 35 37 39 39 39 47 48 
Costa Rica 56 66 61 63 54 70 49 53 46 51 50 48 62 
Dom. Rep*  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 44 48 50 49 48 54 
Ecuador 41 37 40 33 28 28 33 25 30 30 40 44 42 
El Salvador 35 49 49 35 35 47 41 48 43 35 39 44 58 
Guatemala 29 46 55 44 34 41 36 36 39 39 40 39 43 
Honduras 30 56 46 50 41 63 42 40 40 42 39 36 38 
Mexico 24 46 29 41 35 28 28 28 31 42 37 34 35 
Nicaragua 34 54 34 25 36 58 38 31 29 34 47 44 41 
Panama 34 45 40 49 35 47 35 41 33 46 44 42 61 
Paraguay 33 23 31 18 17 14 15 23 22 19 18 29 37 
Peru 39 32 28 34 29 32 23 19 27 35 30 28 35 
Uruguay 52 61 65 65 54 52 45 46 60 61 62 66 72 
Venezuela 36 41 40 58 47 48 42 46 57 60 60 52 51 
Total      36      45 42 42 36 40 36 37 39 42 42 42 48 
(*Dom. Rep is short for Dominican Republic. The Dominican Republic was first included in the survey from 
year 2004. Source: Latinobarometro). 
As the table shows, the measures fluctuate immensely. It should however be noted that there 
has been a total increase in the satisfaction with democracy the last couple of years.  
Uruguay and Costa Rica have the absolute highest all-time scores. The two countries have the 
most stable and legitimate democratic traditions in Latin America, and have sometimes been 
said to be the only consolidated democracies in the region, followed by Chile (Lagos, 
2003:164). It is worth noting that in the polls taken in the period 2005 through 2008, 
Venezuela—a country that has been criticized by the international society for undemocratic 
representation and procedures in the latter years—had a higher mean satisfaction with 
democracy than Costa Rica. With the exception of Uruguay, Venezuela was also the only of 
the Latin American countries which had more satisfied than dissatisfied respondents 
throughout that same period.  
27 
 
2.2 Regional experiences and hypotheses: Socio-
economic conditions.  
2.2.1 Economic growth (H1) 
Economists would perhaps explain the ups and downs in respondents’ satisfaction with 
democracy with the state of the market and the country`s economic situation at the time. 
Mexico and Brazil were gravely affected by the Asian financial virus which “attacked” 
various economies in the world. Mexico was hit in 1995, and Brazil in 1998 (Petras and 
Veltmeyer 2009: 380). In 1999, Brazil had to devaluate their currency due to dangerously low 
foreign reserves and increasing governmental debt (Manrique 2009: 326). The following 
years (1996 in Mexico and 2000 in Brazil) are those where the lowest mean satisfaction with 
democracy is expressed in the two countries.  
Argentina was considered the richest country in Latin America in 1998
13
. The GDP per capita 
in Argentina was 72 % higher than that of Brazil at the time, and almost the double of 
Mexico`s GDP (Manrique 2009:326). The mean satisfaction in Argentina is at its highest in 
the period of investigation in 1998. Later, the country experienced a collapse of the economy 
in the years of 2001-2002, that led to a major financial crisis. This could explain the dip in 
satisfaction with democracy in 2001, and especially in 2002. Recession in Argentina and 
Brazil also affects Uruguay. This little country is dependent upon its neighboring countries for 
export and tourism, and had no means to avoid an economic crisis in 2002. The following 
years of 2003-2004 are those in which the respondents in Uruguay are least satisfied with 
democracy, compared to the otherwise strong results in the period of this investigation.  
Between 2003 and 2007 the economic growth in the whole region was extraordinary high 
(Petras and Veltmeyer 2009:384). This could have contributed to the overall increased 
satisfaction with democracy in this period. In 2008 the brisk economic growth slowed down 
in countries like the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica and Panama due to global economic 
downturn and increased cost of living (Freedom House, 2009
14
). Peru and Uruguay had a 
stable growth rate, while the two Andean countries Ecuador and Bolivia were the only two 
countries with substantial economic growth. Bolivia especially as a producer of raw materials 
                                                 
13
 This statement is based on ‘on paper’ estimations (Manrique 2009:326). Argentina’s GDP per capita 
was at 8.250 $ (ibid.). 
14
 Freedom House is an US based non-governmental organization that conducts research on democracy 
related matters, political freedom and the human rights situation in the world (Freedom House). 
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enjoyed a notable economic growth even in times of recession. This was mostly due to 
increasingly high market prices on raw materials in the world, from 2006. The mean 
satisfaction with democracy in Ecuador and Bolivia increased remarkably between 2007 and 
2008.  
Honduras had a slow economic growth from 2007 to 2009 due to political crisis which 
culminated with the coup d’état in 2009. During that same period, Mexico also experienced 
extreme economic difficulties, as one the largest traders with the global market of the Latin 
American countries. This was both because of the global economic slowdown in 2008-2009 
and for being the “origin” of the swine flu epidemic in 2009 (Freedom House, 2009). These 
economic conditions could partly explain the low satisfaction with democracy in Honduras 
and Mexico between 2007 and 2009.   
El Salvador did also have a slow economic growth from 2007 to 2009, in their case due to 
large budget deficits. However, in El Salvador, this cannot explain the citizens’ satisfaction 
with democracy, as the El Salvadorans were more satisfied in 2008 than the year before, and 
the country with the 4
th
 most satisfied respondents in 2009. Peru also breaks the pattern. 
Being one of the Latin American countries with the most stable and strong growth rates does 
not help the Peruvians from being at the very bottom of list when it comes to citizen 
satisfaction with democracy. Peru has the highest percentage of dissatisfied respondents of all 
the Latin American countries in 2009 (see figure 2.0). 
The long-term perspective indicates that the economic situation of a country may or may not 
be an explanatory factor of citizens’ satisfaction with democracy. It is a longstanding 
presumption that prolonged effectiveness in economic development increases the chance to 
sustain democracy (Lipset 1959:75). Poor economic conditions can affect support for the 
system if the citizens hold the government responsible (Anderson and Guillory 1997:72). 
Favorable economic conditions can lead to an acceptance of less democratic procedures
15
.  
                                                 
15
 Chile and Uruguay can serve as examples of this. In Uruguay, the former military regime did not 
have any clear economic project. The political and economic elite in Uruguay believed that a political 
opening would speed—rather than slow—economic recuperation and supported a transition towards a 
democratic regime (Linz and Stepan 1996:153).  In Chile, on the other hand, the authoritarian regime 
of Pinochet had a strong and progressive economic agenda. The economy politics of Pinochet was 
favorable to the economically strong upper class, which supported the less-democratic regime, anxious 
to keep their benefits (ibid.).  
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Economic growth can contribute to a greater economic and financial stability, which in turn 
allows room for an increase in public welfare. This can be of influence for the satisfaction 
with the functioning of governments and democracy (Malamud et.al 2007:16). This gives the 
hypothesis: 
H1: Positive perception of economic situation increases respondents’ satisfaction with 
democracy.  
However, in taking an economic approach in explaining long-term tendencies in satisfaction 
with democracy in Latin America, we saw that there is no clear indication of the direction of 
how perception of economic situation of country affects citizens’ satisfaction with democracy. 
This leaves us with an alternative hypothesis: 
H1’: Positive perception of economic situation does not affect respondents’ satisfaction with 
democracy. 
2.2.2 Economic inequalities (H2)  
 
In spite of efforts to reduce poverty in Latin America, most of the countries in the region still 
have great difficulties improving the standard of living for a large sector of its population. 
Poor living standards amongst the marginalized groups such as the poor and the indigenous, 
and also women in some of the countries, could affect citizens’ satisfaction with democracy.  
 
The countries with a high national poverty rate
16
 such as Bolivia (60.1 %), Honduras (60 %), 
Mexico (51.3 %), Guatemala (51 %) and Nicaragua (46.2 %) are—with the exception of 
Bolivia—to be found amongst the countries with lower mean satisfaction with democracy.  
The figure 2.1 shows the development of poverty and extreme poverty in Latin America:   
                                                 
16 National poverty rate is the percentage of the population living below the national poverty line. 
National estimates are based on population-weighted subgroup estimates from household surveys 
(World Bank). 
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Figure 2.1: The percentage of the Latin American population that lives in poverty and extreme poverty (1990-
2010). 
 
Poverty is the percentage of population living on less than 2 dollars a day, extreme poverty is the percentage of 
population living on less than 1 dollar a day. (Source: The 2011 report of the Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys 
conducted in the respective countries. The report is based on the 18 countries in the Latinobarometro survey plus 
Haiti. The percentage of the Haitian population that is considered to live in extreme poverty has been estimated 
and deducted from the total).  
 
There have been efforts to improve the social situation in Latin America. An example can be 
that of Venezuela, where social programs were introduced in 2003 (Petras and Veltmeyer 
2009:395).  The Bolivarian Mission as the programs were called was created to speed up the 
government’s actions in priority areas for the neediest of the population (ibid.). This involved 
reducing poverty and introducing social welfare. The introduction of the programs led to a 
strong reduction of poverty. The percentage of the total population living on less than 2 
dollars per day fell from 48.6 % in 2002, to 30.2 % in 2006. The percentage of the population 
living in extreme poverty—less than 1 dollar a day—fell from 22.2 % to 9.9 % in the same 
period, and was further reduced in 2007 (ECLAC, MDG). This could have contributed to the 
obvious increase in satisfaction with democracy in Venezuela from 2006.  
Similar economic reforms and promises of eradicating of extreme poverty have improved the 
poverty statistics in Brazil as well. The percentage of the total population living on less than 2 
dollars per day fell from 38.7 % in 2003, to 24.9 % in 2009. The percentage of the population 
living in extreme poverty in Brazil was halved in the same period, from 14 % to 
approximately 7 % (ECLAC, MDG). Even though the poverty problem is profound in Latin 
America, figure 2.1 shows that it is a decreasing problem in the region as a whole. This could 
correspond to the general increase in satisfaction with democracy in 2009, compared to the 
beginning of the millennium decade.   
23 19 19 13 13 12 
48 
44 44 
33 33 31 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1990 1999 2002 2008 2009 2010
poverty %
extreme poverty %
31 
 
What the table does not show is the increasing gap between rich and poor in Latin America. 
Previous research found that people who live in countries with a high degree of income 
inequality tend to be less satisfied with democracy (Wagner et.al 2003:27). The GINI 
coefficient is a measure of income inequality
17
.  
Figure 2.2: GINI coefficients for countries placed in descending order. Estimates are from the years 2007 to 
2009. 
 
(Source: CIA Factbook).  
Latin America is the region where the countries have the world’s highest income inequality. 
The average GINI coefficient is 0.5, whereas the GINI coefficient is closer to 0.3 in rich 
countries and down to 0.25 in the Scandinavian countries (CIA Factbook).  
Most of the countries in Latin America experienced that economic liberalization and 
democratic consolidation took place almost simultaneously (Lijphart and Waisman 1996:235-
236). The economic liberalization, referring to privatization, deregulation and the opening of 
the economy, increased social differences. The gap between rich and poor became wider as 
well as the gap between ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ within the social classes, between sectors of 
                                                 
17
 The coefficient is a number between 0 and 1, where 0 corresponds with perfect equality and 1 
corresponds with perfect inequality (Hellevik 2002:24).  Family incomes are plotted in cumulatively 
against the number of families arranged from the poorest families to the richest families in every 
country. 
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economy and regions of the country. This is an expected consequence of economic 
liberalization (ibid.). The logic behind the liberalization is that the differences eventually 
diminish because of the mechanisms of the market and the redistributive politics of the 
democratic states. However, when—or where—the consolidation process moves slowly, the 
social differences remain, and will inevitably become harder to even out.  
It is argued that social inequality is the core problem for democracy in Latin America (Lagos 
2003:164). This is not only economic inequality and the vast income differences in the 
societies, but also an unequal distribution of social, political, and welfare rights (ibid.). 
Income differences will be the main focus of this thesis, as it is widely known that the income 
distribution in the Latin American countries is among the most unequal in the world
18
. I 
expect this variable to be of great importance in affecting citizens’ satisfaction with 
democracy, and the hypothesis is as follows 
H2: Perception of fair income distribution in country will increase respondents’ satisfaction 
with democracy.  
2.3 Regional experiences and hypotheses: Political 
conditions 
2.3.1 Legitimacy of political institutions (H3) 
From a political standpoint one would expect that political stability and regime legitimacy 
could affect citizen satisfaction with democracy. Seymour Martin Lipset (1959) argued that 
the stability of a democracy depends on economic development, effectiveness, and the 
legitimacy of its political system.  
Costa Rica is considered the most stable of the Latin American countries with a very low risk 
of economic distress and political unrest, which are the main causes of political instability 
                                                 
18
 The household income or consumption by percentage share is extremely uneven for the lowest 10 % 
and the highest 10 % in several of the Latin American countries. In Colombia the lowest 10 % have 
only 0.8 % share of household income, while the highest 10 % have 45 % share of household income. 
In Bolivia and Honduras the situation is similar. The lowest 10 % have 1 % share of the household 
income in Bolivia, and only 0.6 % in Honduras. The highest 10 % have as much as 45.4 % share of 
household income in Bolivia, and 43.8 % in Honduras. In Norway as a comparison, the lowest 10 % 
have 3.9 % share, while the highest 10 % have 21 % share of household income (estimates from 2009, 
CIA factbook). 
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(EIU
19
, 2009). The country has long democratic traditions, the best social welfare system and 
the highest standards of living in the region. This could explain their overall high mean 
satisfaction with democracy. Uruguay has a similar story. What is special in Uruguay is the 
role that the political parties have played. Uruguay had the sturdiest democratic tradition in 
Latin America before its breakdown. Uruguayan voters have had a tradition of strong party 
identification, even compared to West European standards (Linz and Stepan 1996:152). Even 
during the time of the deeply repressive military regime
20
 most military officers also 
identified with one of Uruguay`s two traditional party “families” (ibid.). The long-term 
loyalty and commitment to political parties have given legitimacy to the party system as a 
political institution. 
At the other end of the scale, all the countries where the majority of the respondents are 
dissatisfied with democracy—Colombia, Argentina, Ecuador, Paraguay, Honduras, 
Guatemala Mexico and Peru—are assumed to have a high risk of political unrest in 2009 
(EIU, 2009). Honduras is the prime example of political unrest, with a re-emerging ghost 
from the past; a coup d’état in 2009. In Colombia, another well-known example, guerilla 
movements and paramilitary groups have made the politics very unstable and fragile for 
decades (Freedom House, 2009). The political turbulence in Colombia is likely to have had a 
negative effect on citizens’ satisfaction with democracy. The political unrest has increased in 
most countries in Latin America in the period 2007- 2009 (EIU, 2009). The mean satisfaction 
with democracy has nevertheless also increased in 80 % of the countries in the same period.  
Lipset (1959:86) also argued that legitimacy involves the “capacity of the system to engender 
and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for 
the society”. Theoretically, democratic legitimacy and democratic institutions have said to be 
inseparable (Karp et.al 2003:273). The inheritance from the authoritarian regimes has been a 
challenge to the legitimacy of the democratic institutions in Latin America.  
Hierarchically led military authoritarian regimes have been said to be a potential advantage 
for transition to democracy; that the military as an institution can see their interests best 
                                                 
19
 The Economist Intelligent Unit`s “Political Instability Index” is a survey in which the rating is based 
on economic distress and underlying vulnerability to unrest in each country (N=165 countries in the 
world). The index draws on the work of the Political Instability Task Force (George Mason 
University, USA) that has created a simple model that has a rate of success of over 80% in identifying, 
ex post, outbreaks of serious instability for a data set that stretches back to 1955 (EIU, 2009).  
20
 Uruguay was an authoritarian regime from 1973 to 1985, dominated by the military from the 
beginning, and ruled by the hierarchically led military from 1976 (Linz and Stepan 1996:152). 
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served somewhat detached from the government (Linz and Stepan 1996:152).  By the same 
token, an authoritarian regime might be a hindrance for further consolidation of democracy. 
This is when the military, before opening up for democratic transition, protected their 
undemocratic procedures by incorporating conditions and terms in the constitution. In many 
of the Latin American countries, the former authoritarian elites made sure they had 
representatives in the parliaments, the councils, the courts and/or the national congresses 
before they delegated the de facto power to democratically elected candidates
21
. 
Unfortunately, these political structures were deeply embedded into society, and have proved 
hard to change.  
In the introduction of this thesis, the argument is that the military is no longer an imminent 
threat to the democracies of Latin America. Problems with weak institutional and 
constitutional controls and strong presidential rule are still challenging the regimes of Latin 
America. “Politicians have an incentive to enhance their power by creating institutions that 
give them greater freedom to act, and by undermining institutions designed to check their 
influence” (Rose-Ackerman et.al 2011:246). Presidents are particularly likely to test the limits 
of their power (ibid.). In Guatemala, as an example, the president can only be elected to one 
four-year term. The one-term restriction was initially introduced as a security buffer against 
power accumulation by the president. However, history has shown that this did not hinder the 
presidential candidates’ quest for personal power enhancement (Sloan 1971:22). The political 
parties in Guatemala arise sporadically and exist only as long as the president is in power. 
Once the president assumes office, the political parties are likely to “turn into agencies of 
employment and business” (Sloan 1971:24).  
At the other end of the spectrum, there are countries in Latin America that have no restrictions 
on presidential re-election. The Venezuelans backed their president Hugo Chavez by voting to 
abolish term limits in a 2009 referendum. Chavez, whom has been accused for “embodying a 
modern form of authoritarian rule”, thus with a democratic mandate (The Economist 2010) 
can run for re-election in 2012 after having held his presidential position since 1999. This can 
be seen as a different form of power accumulation, often referred to as hyper-presidentialism. 
                                                 
21
 A problem that occurred was also that the newly elected candidates did not have the majority in the 
parliament or the congress and was therefore incapable of making any radical changes, or changes at 
all that was not approved by the former authoritarian elites. One example of this situation can be from 
Chile, with the former dictator Pinochet. When the democratic regime came to power in Chile in 1990, 
it confronted a constitutional court with seven relatively young members, all appointed by Pinochet 
and not one of them could be replaced until he reached retirement age (Linz and Stepan 1996:209). 
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This has become a recurrent problem in many of the Latin American democracies since the 
1990s. In Honduras, is has been argued that hyper-presidential tendencies set the stage for the 
coup, as the president Manuel Zelaya—who was ousted in 2009—desired to seek another 
term in office, even though re-election is prohibited according to the Honduran Constitution 
(Corrales and Altschuler, 2009). Argentina has also been criticized for their hyper-presidential 
systems, where for decades the presidents have repeatedly undermined institutional efforts to 
limit their power (Rose-Ackerman et.al 2011:249, Berensztein, 2005).  
Easton (1965:448) point out that trust is stimulated by the experiences that the citizens have of 
the authorities in a long-term perspective. The lack of experience with independent 
institutions and the undermining of the role and function of these could be an obstacle for 
having trust in the democratic institutions.  
Previous research on the relationship between satisfaction with democracy and political trust 
in Europe has turned out vague or ambiguous (Wagner et al. 2003:4). However, when 
referring to the regional experiences with political institutions and regime legitimacy, it is 
likely to believe that trust in democratic institutions would be of importance for respondents’ 
satisfaction with democracy in Latin America. 
H3: Legitimacy of the political system and trust in democratic institutions increases 
respondents’ satisfaction with democracy 
2.3.2 Political participation (H4) 
The social ‘revolution’ that has taken place in many of the countries in Latin America could 
also explain the increased levels of satisfaction with democracy. All of the countries in the 
region have an indigenous population or a population descending from slavery. The term 
‘indigenous’ has generally been used to refer to socially excluded groups (World Bank 
2011:119). The indigenous population constitute a tenth of the approximately 550 million 
inhabitants in Latin America (Manrique 2009:33). Some of the countries have sizable 
populations of indigenous people, especially Bolivia, Peru, Guatemala, Ecuador and Mexico. 
The discrimination and ‘disadvantage’ of being indigenous is still profound in many of the 
countries (World Bank, 2011). According to Freedom House’s report of political rights and 
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civil liberties
22
, initiatives have been taken to include the indigenous population in political 
representation, courts and congresses in Latin America (Freedom House, 2009). In countries 
such as Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador and Venezuela the governments have shown recent efforts to 
include the indigenous in politics, even though their representation still is rather limited 
(Manrique 2009: 42-43). Taking Bolivia as an example, we see that there has been a clear 
increase in satisfaction with democracy from 2006 to 2009. Evo Morales was elected 
president in 2006. He was the very first indigenous president in Bolivia where between 60 % 
and 70 % of the population consider themselves indigenous. Morales’ campaigns to involve 
the indigenous people and the poor in the political arena and social life, may have contributed 
to a positive leap in satisfaction with democracy in Bolivia.  
The other countries with a sizable indigenous population are at the bottom end of the list in 
regards to mean satisfaction with democracy; especially Peru, Mexico and Guatemala. Peru 
and Guatemala are examples of countries where a large indigenous population has been 
excluded from the political sphere. This can indicate that exclusion from participation in 
political processes causes dissatisfaction with democracy.  
If political exclusion leads to political passivity or indifference in regards to regime 
preference, this can be a threat to the survival of democracy. Political passivity and apathy 
amongst the citizens is often measured by failure to vote in election (Campbell 1962:9). 
Electoral statistics show that people of a lower class status have a greater chance of being a 
passive citizen (ibid.). Citizens who believe that their participation can influence the political 
policymaking are likely to be more optimistic in their view of democratic governance 
(Anderson and Guillory 1997:72). Individuals with strong subjective feeling of efficacy have 
been found more likely to vote, to take an interest in political campaigns and to participate in 
party activities (Milbrath, 1965).  
An integration of marginalized groups in the political sphere could increase political 
awareness and involvement. Political interest can be said to be the state of wanting to know or 
learn about politics. Interest in politics has been an indicator of satisfaction with democracy in 
previous research (see Anderson and Guillory, 1997). This gives the hypothesis: 
                                                 
22
 The report Freedom in the World is an annual report published by Freedom House. Freedom in the 
World 2009 includes 193 countries and 16 related or disputed territories (Freedom House, 2009). 
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H4: Interest and involvement in politics will increase respondents’ satisfaction with 
democracy. 
2.3.3  Electoral outcome (H5) 
A long-awaited change in power could also explain positive attitudes towards those 
representing the political regime. Paraguay can be an example of this. Paraguay has had a 
one-party conservative rule for 61 years until Fernandez Lugo, representing the left-wing 
party was elected president in 2008. Paraguay has had the lowest overall mean satisfaction 
with democracy between 1996 and 2009. In 2008 the extremely low scores of the first decade 
of the millennium was turned around. A change in the political landscape might have 
contributed to the start of an upward trend in satisfaction with democracy.  
In El Salvador we see the same pattern. The country had a presidential election in March 2009 
where Mauricio Funes won the election in one round with 51.3 % of the votes. Funes is the 
first left-wing politician to lead the country since the end of the civil war two decades ago. El 
Salvador is one of the countries with the absolute highest increase in mean satisfaction with 
democracy from 2008 to 2009. 
Another example can be from Brazil, where Luiz Inacio Lula de Silva (Lula) was elected 
president in 2002 on the promise of a more fair wealth distribution. Lula succeeded Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso who was the Brazilian president from 1995-2002. Cardoso was known for 
his neoliberal political strategy that left Brazil “for sale” (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2003). The 
lack of economic growth and increased social inequalities in Brazil during Cardoso`s 
presidency could have contributed to the relatively low scores of satisfaction with democracy.  
Lula`s winning of the presidential election was a historical alternation of power, as he became 
the first working-class president in Brazil. His being elected was based upon the voters’ 
optimistic expectations that he would be able to tackle poverty and social inequality (Zobel, 
2005). The citizens’ satisfaction with democracy increased moderately in his first term23. 
                                                 
23
 Lula`s capacity to deliver was an element of uncertainty during his first presidential term. The 
mensalão corruption scandal in 2005, which was directly connected to Lula’s office, did not help the 
citizens’ attitudes towards democracy. However, Lula made himself heard when claiming—following 
the revelations—that: “In the history of the republic, no government has done even 20 % of what we 
are doing to counter corruption. No one has more moral and ethical authority than I do” (Zobel, 2005). 
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However, when he was reelected in 2006 the citizens’ satisfaction with democracy increased 
remarkably in Brazil. 
Political stability and long-awaited political changes could explain the pattern of satisfaction 
with democracy in a long-term perspective. With the exception of the ouster of the Honduran 
president in 2009, Latin America have passed decades without completed coupes d’état, in 
contrast to the 1960s and 1970s
24
. The Latin American region consists of countries that have 
been electoral democracies longer than many of the countries in Europe. The participation in 
the electoral processes has been intensified, especially during the last five to seven years. The 
popularity of the candidates elected has also been considerably higher in this period 
(Latinobarometro).  
Elections will inevitably create both winners and losers as long as the election is open, and 
with competing parties involved. Previous research has found that people who voted for the 
party in power—the winners of the electoral contests—are more likely to be satisfied with the 
way the democracy works (Andersen and Guillory 1997:66, Wagner et.al 2003:16, Linde and 
Ekman 2003:404).  Losers are generally less satisfied with democracy. To see if this is valid 
in a Latin American context, the findings from Europe will serve as the hypothesis: 
 H5: The ‘winners’ of electoral contests are more satisfied with democracy in Latin America 
than ‘losers’. 
 
The hypotheses regarding winner/loser status, interest and political participation, and 
perception of economic situation, are all findings that have been statistically significant in 
explaining citizens’ satisfaction with democracy in Europe. The analysis in chapter 4.0 will 
reveal whether these factors have an effect on respondents’ satisfaction with democracy in 
Latin America as well, or if they do not explain much when tested in a different context. The 
hypothesis regarding legitimacy of the political system and trust in democratic institutions 
embrace many areas in Latin American political history. I expect this to be an important 
factor for citizens’ satisfaction with democracy. Similarly is the hypothesis regarding 
                                                 
24
 Coup attempts in Bolivia (2009) and Ecuador (2010) could also be said to cast a negative shadow 
over the democratic development in the Latin American region since the cold war, even though the 
coupes were not completed. 
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perception of income distribution expected to give results in the analysis, as the economic 
inequality in Latin America is particularly unfair.   
2.4 Contextual experiences and hypotheses  
Latin America is a heterogeneous region. In addition to the individual evaluations of the 
socio-economic and political conditions, there are two country-level factors that I particularly 
expect can have an influence on its citizens’ responses to the question of satisfaction: Natural 
resources and perceived corruption level in country.  
2.4.1 Abundance of natural resources (H6) 
Several of the Latin American countries have large oil reservoirs
25
. Access to natural 
resources can contribute to social and economic development if administered wisely. It is a 
paradox that countries with an abundance of natural resources tend to have worse 
development outcome than countries without such resources. Experience shows that few 
developing countries actually manage to use the incomes from this venue to fight poverty and 
improve living conditions in their country. Or worse, the access to natural resources has 
increased the levels of social inequality and been an incentive for corruption (Robbins, 2000). 
This can have a negative effect on satisfaction with democracy, and gives the hypothesis:  
H6: Abundance of natural resources has a negative effect on satisfaction with democracy.  
Nevertheless, the administration of the natural resources has been an important instrument in 
the campaign of the more left-oriented regimes in Latin America. Large-scale nationalization 
processes of the resources has in countries like Bolivia, Venezuela and Ecuador been used as 
a promise of prosperity and better times to come for the citizens
26
. I expect this to have a 
positive impact on citizens’ satisfaction with democracy. An alternative hypothesis can 
therefore be: 
H6’: Abundance of natural resources has a positive effect on satisfaction with democracy. 
                                                 
25
 Mexico is the 7
th
 largest producer in the world, Venezuela the12
th 
largest producer, and Brazil the 
13
th
 largest producer in the world. However, there are also countries in Latin America such as 
Honduras, Paraguay and Panama, which are not considered ‘oil producing countries’. 
26
 A recent initiative of nationalization is also seen in Argentina. President Christina Kirchner decided 
to take over ownership of the majority of shares in YPF, the largest oil company in Argentina, in April 
2012. The majority of shares have been controlled by the Spanish company Repsol since 1999 
(Østgårdsgjelten, 2012). 
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2.4.2 Corruption (H7) 
The tendency towards an accumulation of power by the president has already been mentioned 
as a challenge to the legitimacy of the democratic regimes of Latin America (see above, part 
2.3). While democratic institutions increase government transparency, a ‘president’s 
government’ will have the opposite effect, and can be a haven for political corruption 
(Whitehead 2002:804, Rossi and Böhmer, 2004, Berensztein, 2005). The lack of control 
within the political system, along with weak institutions and absent external control with 
public holders of office, has led to corruption in Latin America (Whitehead 2002:804). 
Brazil`s first democratically elected civilian president in thirty years, Fernando Collor de 
Mello, was forced to resign in 1992, after less than three years in office as congressional 
enquiries uncovered the scale of his illicit fundraising activities (ibid.). Also former presidents 
such as Perez of Venezuela, Salinas of Mexico, Fujimori of Peru, Menem of Argentina and 
Nicaragua`s Alemàn, have all faced serious corruption charges (Whitehead 2002:806). And 
these are just some examples. In 2004 there had never before been a higher number of former 
and current presidents who faced corruption charges in Latin America.  
Political corruption is a major threat to democratic organization, elections and voting 
procedures. Oscar Arias Sánchez, the former president of Costa Rica (1986-1990 and 2006-
2010) and Nobel Peace Prize Laureate of 1987, once said that corruption is “a pervasive ill 
which damages economic performance and weakens democratic institutions” (Little 1996:64). 
He further expresses that corruption “humiliates the poor who must bribe small officials for 
minimal services, bankrupts the honest trader and empowers unscrupulous captains of 
commerce and their partners, dishonest politicians… it spreads like a cancer to kill all that is 
decent in society” (ibid.). The hypothesis based on Arias Sánchez observations is: 
H7: Corruption is detrimental to respondents’ satisfaction with democracy 
Previous research on permissiveness towards corrupt practices in the world has shown that the 
citizens of Latin America are more tolerant with corrupt practices than citizens of other parts 
of the world (Moreno 2003:265). Small bribes, kickbacks, and vote buying have turned into 
normality. During the presidency of Menem (1989-1999) in Argentina as an example, there 
was no ambiguity or embarrassment in regards to corruption. It was as expected, and the rates 
and procedures were set (Whitehead 2002:805). There have also been examples of high voter 
turnouts for corrupt politicians in Latin America. The Portuguese expression “Rouba, Mas 
Faz”, which translates to “he robs, but he gets things done” has been a common description 
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of politicians in Brazil (Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2010:1). Some will also support corrupt 
candidates because they expect to be provided with certain jobs or receive certain other 
benefits (ibid.). If corruption is a part of the political culture and has turned into normality, it 
might not be of such big significance in affecting citizens’ satisfaction with democracy. An 
alternative hypothesis can therefore be formulated: 
H7’: Corruption does not affect citizens’ satisfaction with democracy in Latin America. 
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3 Data and methodological approach 
This chapter describes the data (Part 3.1) used in the analyses and the methodological 
approach (Part 3.2). The part on methodology also includes a discussion on the validity and 
suitability for statistical measures in general, and the use of the multilevel model in particular. 
An operationalization of the dependent and independent variables follows in part 3.3. 
3.1 Data 
The data used in this thesis has been collected from different sources to obtain information on 
both individual-level and national-level.  
The individual-level information was drawn from the Latinobarometro, poll taken in 2009
27
. 
The Latinobarometro survey is an annual national-sample survey that has existed since 1995, 
following the pattern of the Eurobarometer survey. The survey is produced by the 
Latinobarometro Corporation in Santiago, Chile, with an international advisory board.   
The 2009 poll has been executed in 18 Latin American countries with a representative sample 
selection and a total number of observations of n=20204 respondents
28
. The individual 
country sample sizes are between n=1000 and 1200, with an approximate +/-3 % margin of 
error per country
29
. All single country data sets are self-weighted, or have been weighted 
where the selection procedure required weighting. The interviews were conducted in person 
and in native languages, between the 21
st
 of September and the 26
th
 of October 2009.  
There is no contextual information available in the Latinobarometro data. The country-level 
variables have therefore been merged into the dataset for analysis. I have used The Central 
Intelligence Agency`s (CIA) World Factbook for information on population density and the 
GINI coefficient, and Transparency International`s Corruption Perception Index for a country-
level variable on corruption
30
.  
                                                 
27
 For the long-term perspective table in the previous chapter, I have used the Latinobarometro polls 
from the years of 1996 through 2009.  
28
 The respondents are adults. In all of the countries this means the minimum age of 18, except in 
Brazil and Nicaragua, where the minimum age is 16 years (Latinobarometro, 2009). 
29
 See Appendix B for country-specific technical information. 
30
 Other indicators of economic conditions—such as inflation rates or unemployment rates, based on 
information from the national statistical institutes of the countries in the study—were also taken into 
consideration. The indicators were found to be unreliable sources of comparison as the independence 
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3.1.1 Countries included in the investigation 
The Latinobarometro survey includes all the countries that are considered a part of the Latin 
American and Caribbean region, and share Spanish and Portuguese colonial heritage, except 
Cuba
31
. This means that Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela are the countries of investigation. 
3.2 Method  
3.2.1 Statistical measures: Advantages and challenges 
Lijphart (1971) argues that statistical methods are superior to other forms of comparative 
methods, because of the precision of the results
32
. Statisticians on the other hand, have been 
criticized for treating statistical results as more valid than other forms of explanations 
(Frendreis 1983:258). A common criticism against statistical analysis is the ceteris paribus 
condition. This means that while estimating the effect of one variable in an analysis, the other 
variables are held constant. This condition is vital to empirical generalizations and can 
according to Lijphart be “achieved by a process of deliberate randomization” (1971:683). The 
problem is that the ceteris paribus condition does not exist in real life and that the statistical 
controlling procedure therefore can disguise important factors of influence (Frendreis 
1983:259).  
However, statistical analyses based on a random sample do offer strong results that maintain 
external validity, and can therefore be used for generalizations beyond the sample. Another 
advantage in using statistical methods is that they include an extensive quantity of information 
in the analysis. The large number of cases reduces the potential for causal over-determination 
                                                                                                                                                        
of the statistical institutes can be debated. The authorities in countries like Argentina have been 
criticized for tampering with analysis results to make the situation of the country look better (see The 
Economist, 2012). 
31
According to the Latinobarometro representative Carlos Macuda (2010) there is no official 
explanation to why Cuba is excluded from the annual surveys. Since the research question in this 
thesis is regarding attitudes towards democracy, mainly based on respondents’ experiences with 
democracy in their own country in 2009, obtaining additional information on Cuba seemed 
unnecessary. 
32
 This is when experimental method cannot be used. The experimental method is the ideal 
approximation of scientific explanation, but can rarely be used in political science (Lijphart 1971:683-
684). 
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of the dependent phenomenon that can happen in comparative methods with fewer cases 
(Lijphart 1975:172). Statistical analysis also makes the investigation verifiable for future 
analysis on the same subject, and is suitable for comparing tendencies in a long-term 
perspective. 
The purpose of this thesis is to find trends and differences in the satisfaction with democracy 
in 18 Latin American countries. Utilizing statistical methods to analyze data from public 
opinion surveys conducted in various countries can present challenges. One example can be 
whether or not the analysis allows the different socio-political contexts to be taken into 
account. A multilevel approach can meet this challenge as it controls and exposes the 
relationship between the observations, and thus, brings awareness to if the effects of the 
variables in the analysis vary between the countries.  
3.2.2 The multilevel method 
A multilevel analysis is a regression analysis with structured data. In a simple linear 
multilevel model, the individuals are level-1units, and the countries are level-2 units. At the 
individual-level the assumptions of linear multilevel models are identical to the assumptions 
of a standard OLS regression. In addition to this, the level-1 units are assumed to be nested 
within the level-2 units in multilevel models (Steenbergen and Jones 2002:221), in other 
words; the individuals are nested within the countries.  
The multilevel model is a combination of the level-1 model: Yij = b0j + b1j∙x1 + eij, and the 
two level-2 models: b0j = g00 + g01∙z1 + u0j and b1j = g10 + g11∙z1+ u1j. This is a model with 
one independent variable on level-1 (x) and one independent variable on level-2 (z). The z 
variables denote characteristics of the countries that explain the variance of the regression 
coefficients. The index i refer to a level-1 unit, the individuals. The country index j denotes 
that both the intercept b0j and the coefficients b1j are expected to differ from country to 
country and are therefore referred to as ‘random’. The g parameters denote the mean 
satisfaction with democracy for the level-2 units. The mean g00 is thus the ‘fixed part’. The 
level-2 residuals u0j and u1j indicates that the intercept (u0j) and the coefficients of the 
independent variables (u1j) vary between countries. The residuals are negative for countries 
with less than average satisfaction with democracy, and positive for the countries with more 
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than average satisfaction with democracy. Combining the level-1 and the level-2 model a 
single equation expression of the complete multilevel model can be written as:  
Yij = g00 + g01∙z1 + (g10 + g11∙z1) ∙x1 + u0j + u1j∙ x1 + eij. The model includes cross-level 
interaction between the level-1 and the level-2 variables. 
 
In the analysis of this thesis it was anticipated that the level-2 indicators would explain the 
variance in citizens’ satisfaction with democracy. However, it was not anticipated that the 
level-2 indicators would explain any variance in the coefficients of the level-1 variables, and 
therefore, the z- variables can be left out of the second level-2 equation. The regression 
coefficients of some of the level-1 variables are still allowed to vary. A simplified
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expression of the multilevel model for my analysis can thus be written as a combination of the 
level-1 model: Yij = b0j + b1j∙x1 + eij, and the two level-2 models: b0j = g00 + g01∙z1 + u0j and 
b1j = g10 + u1j.  A single equation for my thesis can be expressed as:  
Yij = g00 + g01∙z1 + g10∙x1+ u0j + u1j∙x1 + eij. 
  
Both fixed-effects model and random-effects model include cluster-specific intercepts to 
account for unobserved heterogeneity. Fixed-effects model means that the intercept is allowed 
to vary between clusters—in this instance countries—but the effect of the level-1 predictor is 
assumed to be the same. The fixed-effects model is the basis model in multilevel analysis. The 
fixed-effects model can be expanded by adding certain variables as random-effects. In a 
random-effects model both the intercept and the level-1 predictors are allowed to vary 
between clusters. I will apply a random-effects model to the variables for which I assume the 
coefficients to vary between the respondents, in relation to their country of origin. 
3.2.3 Advantages and challenges to the multilevel model  
Individual-level factors, as opinions or attitudes, are likely to be somewhat defined by 
contextual conditions and common experiences (Steenbergen and Jones 2002:219). When 
homogeneity within countries is present, multilevel model analysis can be useful. It is 
generally expected that respondents from the same country, or cluster, have had common 
influences that can lead to correlations among responses in the same cluster (Rabe-Hesketh 
                                                 
33
 The equation expression indicates a model with only one independent variable on level-1 and one 
independent variable on level-2. 
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and Skrondal 2008:85). Thus, the respondents in cross-national survey data are not 
independent observations, but clustered and to some degree duplications of each other. This 
violates the assumption that the errors are independent, which is an underlying assumption for 
the standard models for data analysis, such as the OLS regression (Steenbergen and Jones 
2002:220), and is an argument for applying a multilevel model to nested data. 
By using multilevel analysis we can “capture the layered structure of multilevel data, and 
determine how layers interact and impact a dependent variable of interest” (Steenbergen and 
Jones 2002:218). This, however, is most successful when analyzing a large number of 
clusters, which is a hard criterion to meet when analyzing countries or groups of countries. 
There are only 18 countries included in the survey data for this investigation. It is not 
impossible to perform a multilevel analysis on 18 clusters, but it is a critically low number of 
clusters. Some argue that the random-effects approach should only be used if there are more 
than 20 clusters in the sample (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008:61). Others argue that the 
variance components are estimated rather poorly when there are less than 50 clusters in the 
sample (Hox 2009:167). 
Another challenge to the multilevel approach is the inclusion of sampling weights. Comparing 
unweighted and weighted results could help clarify whether the estimation process, type of 
outcome, or other factors bias the results (Carle, 2009). However, it has been recommended to 
show caution when including sampling weights in multilevel model analysis (ibid.). One 
suggestion to the inclusion of sampling weights in the multilevel analysis could be by sample 
size, based on the single country data sets. However, the sample sizes of the countries in the 
Latinobarometro survey are rather similar—eleven of the countries have a sample size of 
1200 respondents, and the remaining seven countries have a sample size of 1000 
respondents—which gives reason to believe that a weighting by sample size would not 
contribute to a significant change in the results. Another possibility is to use the variables on 
which the weights are based—or the weights themselves—as predictors in the model, to 
check whether the interpretations change, when the weights are included as extra covariates 
(Hox, 2012). This would require access to the weights in the single country data sets, which 
are not available in the aggregated survey used for this thesis. Anyhow, the mixed model 
approach in SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Sciences) utilized for this thesis does not 
deal with sampling weights (Hox, 2012). The results presented in the next chapter are thus 
based on weighted single country survey data, without including any additional sampling 
weights for the multilevel analysis.    
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The gain from utilizing more complex models, like the multilevel model versus a standard 
OLS regression model has been debated. The argument against using a multilevel model is 
that if a one-level model can give close to exactly the same results, a less complex model is 
easier to read and comprehend. I will therefore compare the results from the multilevel model 
with the results from the same analysis with a standard OLS regression model approach to 
demonstrate the gains and losses of information. 
3.3 Key variables 
In this part the dependent variable—satisfaction with democracy—and the independent 
variables will be operationalized. The independent variables chosen are expected to give the 
most accurate information of the phenomenon satisfaction with democracy based on the 
hypothesis formulated in the previous chapter, and the data available for this investigation
34
.  
3.3.1 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable, satisfaction with democracy, is operationalized by the following 
question in the Latinobarometro survey:  
In general, would you say you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not 
satisfied at all with the way democracy works in (country)?  
The answers have been converted into a country mean, on a scale ranging from 0 to 100. Very 
satisfied has been given the maximum score of 100, fairly satisfied the score 75, not very 
satisfied the score 25, and not satisfied at all has been given a score of zero. The respondents 
that have answered don’t know can be considered to fall in between the negative and positive 
categories, and have therefore been placed in the middle, with a score of 50. The respondents 
that have abstained from answering constitute an insignificant percentage (< 1 %) and are 
therefore treated as missing values.   
                                                 
34
 See Appendix B for precise wording of the questions used as individual-level independent variables. 
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The country mean satisfaction with democracy is presented in the following figure: 
Figure 3.0: Mean satisfaction with democracy in Latin America (2009) after recoding the dependent variable. 
The countries are ranged from high to low satisfaction 
 
(Source: Latinobarometro 2009) 
3.3.2 Independent variables: Perception of socio-economic 
conditions 
Economic situation 
The respondents’ perception of economic situation has been operationalized by a variable 
measuring the respondents’ perception of current national economic situation. The responses 
are arranged from positive to negative values. Very good and good are coded as 4 and 3, while 
bad and very bad evaluation is coded as 1 and 0 respectively. Respondents who have 
answered about average are placed in the middle coded as 2 along with the respondents who 
answered that they don’t know, as the categories do not indicate a clear negative or positive 
evaluation of current economic situation.  
The variable is labeled ‘economy’ in the analysis. 
Economic inequalities 
Economic inequality has been operationalized by a question of how fair the respondents find 
the income distribution in their country. The responses are arranged from positive to negative 
values. The respondents that think the distribution is very fair have been coded as 4, those that 
find it fair has been coded as 3. Unfair is coded as 1, while those that find the distribution 
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very unfair have been coded as 0. The respondents who have answered don’t know are placed 
in the middle coded as 2.  
The variable is labeled ‘income’ in the analysis.  
3.3.3 Independent variables: Perception of political conditions 
Legitimacy of political institutions and trust  
Legitimacy of political institutions has been operationalized by a set of indicators measuring 
respondents’ confidence in various political institutions. Examining the correlation between 
available survey items revealed a significant overlap between the indicators regarding 
confidence in the government, the national congress or parliament, the judiciary, the political 
parties, the public administration and the local government. The indicators weigh on one 
underlying factor that represents the concept ‘democratic institutions’. The variable trust in 
democratic institutions was then constructed by summing the scores for the indicators. Very 
high trust has been coded as 4, high trust as 3. Low trust has been coded as 1, while very low 
trust has been coded as 0. The respondents who have answered don’t know are placed in the 
middle coded as 2, since the category does not indicate a specific placement on the high-low 
scale.  
The variable is labeled ‘trust’ in the analysis. 
Interest and involvement in politics 
The variable measuring the respondents’ understanding of political processes or the 
respondents’ urge to know about politics has been operationalized by a question in the 
Latinobarometro survey asking to what degree the respondents are interested in politics. The 
respondents who have answered that they are very interested have been coded as 4, moderate 
interest has been coded as 3, low interest has been coded as 1, and those that have no interest 
have been coded as 0. The respondents who have answered don’t know are placed in the 
middle coded as 2, as the category does not indicate a specific placement on the high-low 
scale.  
The variable is labeled ‘interest’ in the analysis.  
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Winner versus loser in electoral competition 
The variable identifying if the respondents are political winners or losers are operationalized 
the same way as it has been done in Anderson and Guillory`s studies on satisfaction with 
democracy in Europe (1997), with an observation of whether or not the party voted by the 
respondents in the last election corresponds with the party in government. If the respondents’ 
choice of political party in the last election match the party or parties in government, they 
have been coded with the high value =1. Opposition party or other parties have been coded as 
0. The variable only separates between those that are ‘winners’, and those that are not. The 
recoded variable does not distinguish between those that voted oppositional parties and those 
that did not vote at all. Not voting cannot be perceived as a clear support of the party in 
government, and will therefore count as being a ‘loser’ in this analysis.  
The variable is labeled ‘winner/loser’ in the analysis. 
 
The total number of respondents that have abstained from answering is relatively low (< 1 %) 
and the ‘no answer’ category will be coded as missing35. All scaled variables have been 
centered to prevent the interaction between the variables to disturb the results in the multilevel 
analysis.  
 
                                                 
35
 I ran tests to check for correlation between the ‘don`t know’ and ‘no answer’ (DK/NA) 
responses to all the individual-level questions used as independent variables, to make sure the 
DK/NA responses of one question did not correlate with the same responses in other 
questions. I found a strong positive association for all of the questions, because of the high 
number of ‘don`t know’ responses. The ‘don`t know’ responses were then coded into a middle 
category for all the variables.  
 
I ran another test checking for correlations amongst the ‘no answer’ responses of the 
variables. I found only a weak positive association between the questions regarding trust in 
the democratic institutions. ‘Armed forces’ were one of the institutions mentioned in the 
survey. I chose not to include the question regarding trust in ‘armed forces’ in the index for 
two reasons. First, the number of respondents that have abstained from answering is too high 
to code as missing (9.6 %). Second, the index is called trust in democratic institutions, and the 
army and its associated regimes are still far from being considered democratic institutions in 
many of the Latin American countries. Institutions such as the church and ‘television’ have 
also been left out, as the democratic aspect of these institutions can be disputed. 
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There is no clear pattern to be found when comparing levels of economic inequality 
(measured by GINI coefficient) and the mean satisfaction with democracy in the different 
countries (see table 2.1, chapter 2). Some of the countries with high mean satisfaction with 
democracy, such as Panama and Chile, still have relatively high social inequality. And vice 
versa, Argentina and Nicaragua that are considered more equal in terms of their GINI 
coefficients still have a relatively low mean satisfaction with democracy. In addition to this, 
people normally compare their income to the incomes of those of a reference group—such as 
fellow citizens—and adjust the expectations thereafter (Verme 2011:2). This gives reason to 
believe that the effect of this variable, if any, is context-specific. The variable will therefore 
be added to the multilevel model as a random effect.  
The variables measuring the respondents’ perception of economic situation and trust in 
democratic institutions have also been added to the model as random effects. This is because I 
expect that respondents from the same country might respond more similarly to these 
questions as a consequence of the political traditions and the economic evolution of their 
country.  
3.3.4 Independent variables: Contextual conditions 
Natural Resources 
To measure the abundance of natural resources in the Latin American countries I chose to 
focus on the oil production. This is because oil production is a universal measure, and 
knowledge of the revenue this production generates will be an underlying common reference. 
Oil production is operationalized by barrels per day (bbl. /day), a measure used to describe the 
rate of crude oil production a day. The variable has been divided into four categories, where 
high production (more than one million bbl. /day) is coded as 1, moderate production (more 
than 100.000 bbl. /day) is coded as 2, low production (more than 1000 bbl. /day) is coded as 
3, and no production (less than 1000 bbl. /day) is coded as 4.  
The variable has been labeled ‘oil’ for the analysis.  
Corruption 
Corruption is defined as “the abuse of entrusted power for a private gain” (Transparency 
International), and is measured by Transparency International`s yearly Corruption Perception 
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Index. Their information is derived from 13 different expert and business surveys and is 
therefore a “survey of surveys” (ibid.). Analyses are based on local surveys conducted by 
region, combined with analyses made by major institutions like the World Bank, The 
Economist Intelligent Unit and Freedom House. The index does not represent the actual level 
of corruption, but rather the perceived level of public and political sector corruption in the 
countries included in the ranking
36
. The Corruption Perception Index gives all countries a 
score on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is perceived as highly corrupt and 10 is perceived as 
very clean.  
The variable is labeled ‘corruption’ in the analysis. 
3.3.5 Demographic variables 
I control for the socio-demographic variables sex and age in the analysis. The control 
variables are added to see if they represent underlying factors that might affect the 
respondents’ satisfaction with democracy. Sex has been coded 0 for females and 1 for male 
respondents. The age variable range from 16 years to 98 years and has been recoded into eight 
categories
37
.  
I have added density as a country-level control. Density is the population divided by the total 
land area of country. I have added the variable because of the vast disparities of density in the 
Latin American countries, where for example El Salvador has 32 times the density of Bolivia. 
The most densely populated countries will often have a higher urbanization rate due to small 
land-area. Countries with high density can be perceived as ‘overpopulated’ countries, which 
might be a challenge to the infrastructure, or the access to resources and the common good—
such as social benefits—and thus be a strain to the citizens satisfaction of life in general. I am 
interesting in seeing if this is correlated to satisfaction with democracy.  
 
                                                 
36
 For a full methodological description see Transparency International.org 
37 The categories are coded as follows: Lowest through 20 years are coded as 1, 21-30 years are coded 
as 2, 31-40 years are coded as 3, 41-50 years are coded as 4, 51-60 years are coded as 5, 61-70 years 
are coded as 6, 71-80 years are coded as 7, and 81 years through highest age is coded as 8. 
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4 Results and findings 
In this chapter, the findings from the analyses will be presented. This thesis argues that the 
multilevel method is appropriate for this particular investigation. I will compare the results 
from the multilevel model approach to results from an OLS regression analysis, to see if a less 
complex model would give a similar outcome. The multilevel model approach allows for the 
homogeneity within countries and the heterogeneity between countries to count. The 
information from the analysis is thus more nuanced than that of a one-level model. However, 
in a multilevel model the countries are treated as a random sample of countries. An OLS 
regression approach—including interaction between the individual-level variables and the 
countries—can specify in which of the Latin American countries the effects of the 
independent variables matter. 
The chapter starts by summarizing the results from the multilevel model. Part 4.2 includes the 
reviewing of the results in regards to the hypotheses. Finally, the result from the standard 
OLS regression is presented and discussed in part 4.3.  
4.1  Findings by multilevel model approach 
Table 4.0 presents the results from the multilevel analysis. The analysis results consist of five 
models where additional variables are included in each model. 
The first model is the intra-class correlation (ICC) model that measures the between-cluster 
variance. Thus, the first model shows the variance in a model without covariates. The ICC 
model is used to determine whether or not multilevel analysis is appropriate. The results 
shows that between-country variation accounts for approximately 10 %
38
 of the variance of 
satisfaction with democracy, which is substantial considering the recommended use of 
multilevel analysis with an ICC > .05 (Heck et.al 2010:74).  
The second model adds the socio-demographic background variable sex and age to the ICC 
model. The control variable sex is significant (p< .05) in this model, but not significant when 
adding other independent variables to the analysis, and has little further value as a control 
variable. The age variable is not significant in this model, but it is significant in all the 
following models.  
                                                 
38
 110.29 / (992.21 + 110.29) = 0.10 (see Table 4.0, model 1) 
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Table 4.0: The results from the multilevel analysis of indicators effect on satisfaction with democracy in eighteen countries 
 Predictor variables Model 1  Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Model 5 
 
 Model 6  
 b 
Std. 
Error 
b 
Std. 
Error 
b 
Std. 
Error 
b 
Std. 
Error 
b 
Std. 
Error 
β b 
Std. 
Error 
Intercept 48.33**  (2.49) 47.01**  (2.53) 45.36**  (1.92) 45.89** (1.61) 30.72** (3.72)  31.36** (3.96) 
Sex    1.06*  (0.45) -0.71 (0.42) -0.35 (0.41) -0.35 (0.41)  -0.33 (0.41) 
Age    0.24 (0.13) 0.34** (0.13) 0.29* (0.12) 0.29* (0.12)  0.28* (0.12) 
Winner/loser    
  
7.91**  (0.50) 5.73** (0.49) 5.74** (0.49) 0.06 6.13** (1.18) 
Economy    
  
9.63**  (0.86) 6.26** (0.47) 6.26** (0.47) 0.19 6.23** (0.45) 
Interest    
  
1.80**  (0.16) 0.71** (0.16) 0.71** (0.16) 0.03 0.68** (0.17) 
Trust    
    
6.80** (0.45) 6.79** (0.46) 0.20 6.65** (0.49) 
Income    
    
4.51** (0.35) 4.51** (0.35) 0.14 4.46** (0.34) 
Density          0.03 (0.02)  0.03 (0.02) 
Oil    
      
1.65 (1.06)  1.51 (1.13) 
CPI    
      
0.25** (0.08) 0.11 0.23* (0.09) 
 
  
        
   
Variance components   
        
   
Residual 992.21**   991.88**  (9.90) 882.39**  (8.84) 813.15**  (8.20) 813.14** (8.20)  809.61** (8.17) 
Intercept 110.29**   109.84**  (37.98) 61.28**  (21.36) 41.66**  (14.63) 20.53* (8.11)  23.14* (9.17) 
Economy   
  
12.03**  (4.48) 2.83*  (1.40) 2.82* (1.39)  2.41 (1.25) 
Trust   
    
2.68*  (1.24) 2.68* (1.24)  3.23* (1.45) 
Income   
    
1.44 (0.76) 1.48 (0.77)  1.26 (0.70) 
Winner/loser            20.46* (8.57) 
Interest            0.056 (0.16) 
-2LL 195675.81 195669.06 192285.95 188381.74 188374.92  188321.05 
        
** Sig. p< .01. *Sig. p< .05. Labels: Winner/loser is short for having supported the winning party/winning coalition in last election or not. Economy is short for perception of 
national economy. Interest is political interest. Trust is short for trust in democratic institutions. Income is short for perception of fairness of income distribution in country. 
Density is population density. Oil is barrels of oil produced in country per day and CPI is corruption perception index. The standardized coefficient β have been added for the 
significant effects in model 5 (Source: Latinobarometro. 2009).
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The third model adds the factors that had an influence on satisfaction with democracy in 
Europe to model 2. These are the variables regarding respondents’ winner/loser status, 
perception of economic situation in country, and political interest. The results in model 3 
(Table 4.0) shows that there is a significant (p< .01) and positive effect (b =7.91) of being a 
winner in electoral competitions on respondents satisfaction with democracy. Similarly, there 
are significant (p< .01) and positive effects of perception of economic situation (b =9.63) and 
political interest (b =1.80). The effects of the variables are in the same direction as the results 
from previous research on satisfaction with democracy in Europe. This shows that the 
findings from previous research have relevance in a Latin American context as well. 
In the fourth model, I have added trust in democratic institutions and perception of income 
distribution. These variables were added last of the individual-level indicators, because I 
anticipated the effect of these variables to be of particular importance to respondents 
satisfaction with democracy in Latin America. The model shows a significant (p< .01) 
positive effect (b =6.80) of trust in democratic institutions on respondents satisfaction with 
democracy. As expected, there is also a significant (p< .01) positive effect (b =4.51) of 
perceiving the income distribution to be fair (model 4, Table 4.0).  
The fifth model adds the country-level variables to model 4, and thus includes all the 
individual-level indicators and the country-level indicators in this investigation. The drop in 
the effects of winner/loser, economy and interest from model 3 to model 5 comes from 
controlling for additional variables. Density is added as a control variable
39
. The parameter 
estimate for density is not significant, nor is the effect of the country-level variable oil 
production. The variable measuring corruption is the only country-level variable that has had 
a significant effect on respondents’ satisfaction with democracy40.  
The parameter estimates (b) of the variables with significant effect on respondents satisfaction 
with democracy in model 5, have been converted to standardized coefficients (beta) to 
facilitate the interpretation of the effects, by the formula: beta = b∙ sx/sy. In the formula, x 
                                                 
39
 Since density is a country-level control, it is added along with the country-level indicators. 
40
 Previous research indicated that the effect of the variables trust and corruption were correlated (see 
Moreno, chapter 1, part 1.3). I ran a test to see if I could find the same result, but the interaction 
variable between trust and corruption did not turn out significant in this analysis, and is not 
commented any further. 
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represents the standard deviation of the different independent variables and y represents the 
standard deviation of the dependent variable (Hox 2010:22). These results and the rest of the 
findings in model 5 will be further commented under the reviewing of results in part 4.2.   
Comparing model 5 to the ICC model, we see that the independent variables have reduced the 
level-1 variance in satisfaction with democracy by 18 %
41
. The independent variables have 
also reduced the between-country (level-2) variance. An estimation of this reduction indicates 
that the independent variables explain more than 80 % of the variance of the intercept
 42
, 
which shows that the variables are relevant when predicting the level-2 variance in 
satisfaction with democracy. 
4.1.1 Model 6: An explorative approach 
All comments regarding the explorative approach are based on the information in Table 4.0, 
model 6. In this model, I let the coefficients of the variables previously added only as fixed 
effects vary between countries as well. This concerns the winner/loser variable and the 
political interest variable. The comments regarding model 6 only serve as an explanation of 
this particular experiment, while model 5 is the basis for testing the hypotheses. 
In chapter 3 (part 3.2.2), I argued that I would add all individual-level variables, for which I 
expected the effect to vary between countries, as random effects in the analysis. I then chose 
to add the variables measuring perception of economic situation, trust in democratic 
institutions and perception of fairness regarding income distribution as random effects in the 
model. This was because I expected these socio-economic and political predictors to be 
influenced by decision-making processes and historical development of the individual 
countries.  
For the variables measuring winner/loser status and political interest I expected the effect to 
be fixed. In other words, I did not expect that neither the effect of having voted for the party 
that won the election, nor being interested in politics would give an increase in satisfaction 
with democracy for respondents in some countries, but not in others. The choice to estimate 
the effects of the selected variables as random in model 5 was based on my subjective 
reasoning. In model 6, I therefore wanted to take an explorative approach and add all 
                                                 
41
 (992.21-813.14) / 992.21 
42
 (110.29-20.53) / 110.29 - The country mean for each independent variable differs immensely, and 
could contribute to the high percentage turnout of explained level-2 variance. 
57 
 
individual-level variables as random effects, to see how this would affect the outcome of the 
analysis.  
The results from the experimental analysis show that being a winner or a loser in electoral 
contest indeed should have been added as a random effect. There is a statistically significant 
(p< .05) variance of the effect between countries. This means that having voted for the party 
or the president in power gives an increase in citizens’ satisfaction with democracy, and that 
the effect is different for the respondents depending on which country they are from.  
The variance component for being interested in politics did not turn out significant, and that 
gives reason to believe that high political interest contributes to an increase in satisfaction 
with democracy in Latin America, no matter which country the respondents are from.  
When adding winner/loser status and interest in politics as random effects in model 6, the 
variance component for the perception of economic situation is no longer significant. 
4.2 Reviewing the results 
All comments regarding the testing of the hypotheses in this part are based on the highlighted 
information in model 5, Table 4.0. 
4.2.1 Socio-economic conditions (H1 and H2) 
The socio-economic factors have the strongest effects on respondents’ satisfaction with 
democracy of the factors tested in this investigation.  
Evaluation of economic performance is important in determining respondents’ satisfaction 
with democracy in Latin America, as well as in Europe. The coefficients for perception of 
economic situation show that the variable has a significant (p< .01) positive effect (b = 6.26) 
on respondents’ satisfaction with democracy. This confirms the hypothesis H1, that 
respondents with a positive perception of economic situation are more satisfied with 
democracy. Since the variable was operationalized by respondents’ perception of current 
national economic situation, I expected that the results would be country-specific, and the 
variable was added to the model as a random effect. This was confirmed by the analysis, as 
the variance component of economic situation was significant (p< .05).   
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Previous research on satisfaction with democracy in Western Europe has shown that 
economic performance has an impact on citizens’ satisfaction with the way democracy works 
(Anderson and Guillory 1997:72). The global economic recession in 2008 reached Latin 
America at a time where several years of strong economic growth had left the region well 
equipped for economic fluctuation (Malamud et.al 2009:15). This may have contributed to the 
positive perception of democracy. 
 
Income inequality has been found to have a consistent and negative effect on life satisfaction 
worldwide (Verme 2011:17). In Latin America, the extreme income inequalities have made 
this a factor that affects the citizens’ satisfaction with democracy. The respondents who find 
the income distribution to be fair are also more satisfied with democracy (b = 4.51
43
). This 
confirms the hypothesis H2, that income distribution does affect respondents satisfaction with 
democracy, and that a perception of fair income distribution gives an increase in satisfaction 
with democracy.  
It is not possible to detect any variation between the countries when measuring the effect of 
income distribution in the analysis. The variance component for the income variable was not 
significant. I mentioned earlier (chapter 2, part 2.2.2) that Latin America is the region with the 
world’s highest income inequality, and that the GINI coefficient for the Latin American 
countries holds an extremely high average. There are only small differences between the 
countries. This can be one explanation of why the effect of this variable on respondents’ 
satisfaction with democracy differs little from one country to another. 
4.2.2 Political conditions (H3, H4 and H5) 
Trust in democratic institutions has the absolute strongest effect on respondents satisfaction 
with democracy of the factors tested in this investigation
44
. The effect is significant (p< .01) 
and, as expected, in the positive direction (b = 6.79) indicating that the respondents who have 
more trust in democratic institutions also are more satisfied with democracy. This supports the 
hypothesis H3, that trust in democratic institutions increases the respondents’ satisfaction 
with democracy.  
                                                 
43
 The effect is significant (p< .01). 
44
 (Beta= .20, see model 5, Table 4.0). 
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Political distrust has been said to be a part of the ‘soul’ of Latin America, as a response to the 
history of the region with the Spanish and Portuguese colonization followed by the rule of 
large landowners through authoritarian regimes (Lagos 1997:126). The continuing social 
pattern, such as hierarchical structures of authority and passiveness of citizens towards the 
patron, are still part of the political culture in Latin America (Lagos 2001:142). This may be 
an explanation to the recurrence of hyper-presidentialism and the continuing support for 
hyper-presidential systems in Latin America. The ancient form of patron-client relationship in 
Latin America was peasants who worked and obeyed their patron in exchange of a small wage 
and a promise of protection. The contemporary form of patron-client relationship refers to the 
distribution of state resources—financial support, jobs, contracts and services—in exchange 
for political loyalty and support from the citizens (Roniger 2004:355). “People are 
accustomed to hoping that ‘someone’ will solve their problems” (Lagos 2001:142). While this 
‘someone’ was the patron in the past, the citizens now look to the democratic regime for a 
solution (ibid.). When the citizens expectations are that the democratic regime will solve all 
of their problems, it makes is hard for the regime to meet the expectations. The analysis 
shows that the respondents, who believe that the existing political institutions will solve their 
problems and attend to the needs of the citizens, are more satisfied with democracy.  
The variance component of trust in democratic institutions is statistically significant (p< .05). 
In spite of a regional ‘heritage of distrust’ (Lagos 1997:129), the results indicate that the 
political and historical heritage shared by fellow countrymen will often result in a response 
that is more similar than the response of those from another country.  
 
Political interest is also a statistically significant (p< .01) and positive predictor (b = 0.71) of 
satisfaction with democracy in Latin America. This confirms the hypothesis H4. The findings 
coincide with the findings in previous research on satisfaction with democracy in Europe. The 
effect of the variable is moderate to low in both regions. However, the effect was only 
significant in two of eleven countries in the study on Western Europe (Anderson and Guillory, 
1997). In Latin America, interest in politics does have a positive effect on respondents’ 
satisfaction with democracy, maybe more so than in Europe.  
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Another finding that coincides with previous research is that electoral outcome has an impact 
on the levels of satisfaction with democracy (see Anderson and Guillory, 1997 and Linde and 
Ekman, 2003). There is a significant (p< .01) positive effect (b = 5.74) of being a ‘winner’ in 
electoral competitions in Latin America. This confirms the hypothesis H5, that the 
respondents having voted for a party in government
45
 (i.e., the ‘winners’) tend to be more 
satisfied than those who did not vote, or voted for a party that did not make it into government 
(i.e., the ‘losers’). The effect is moderate (beta =.06).  
A remark to this observation is that the survey data used in this investigation compares the 
winners and losers after the election. It is thus not measured whether it is the fact of winning, 
per se, that generates the satisfaction with democracy. Prior studies has shown that in 
comparing the voters satisfaction with democracy before and after an election, the ‘winners’ 
are more satisfied than the ‘losers’ with the way the democracy works (Blais and Gelineau 
2007:435). This is consistent with my findings in this investigation, and the findings in the 
previous research I used to formulate the hypothesis (see Anderson and Guillory, 2007, Linde 
and Ekman, 2003). However, the eventual winners of the election have a tendency to be more 
satisfied than the eventual losers, even before the election takes place (Blais and Gelineau 
2007:435), which indicates that it is not just the actual election outcome that determines the 
winners’ satisfaction with democracy (ibid.).  
Another remark to the observation is that prior investigators (Blais and Gelineau) have found 
that satisfaction with democracy increases after an election for both losers and non-voters, as 
well as the winners of the election (2007:437), suggesting that “the end of the electoral cycle 
has a positive effect on everyone`s evaluation of the democratic process” (ibid.). This can 
indicate that the attitudes towards democracy are related to the cycle of electoral process. The 
data in which this thesis is based on does not offer ‘before and after’ data, and thus do not 
open for further analysis to control if these additional findings are valid in a Latin American 
context.  
4.2.3 Contextual conditions (H6 and H7) 
When operationalizing an abundance of natural resources by oil production, it is not possible 
to detect any statistically significant effect (on a 5% level) of this variable on respondents’ 
                                                 
45
 The winning party refers to a party that made it into government, or kept its governing position in 
the election. 
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satisfaction with democracy in the analysis. Neither H6 nor H6’ can thus be confirmed. This 
could be related to the operationalization of the variable, and does not mean that there is no 
connection between the countries access to natural resources and satisfaction with democracy 
in real life. The operationalization was based on the assumption that oil is the most 
universally recognizable example of a natural resource, which in retrospect could have been 
said to be an oversimplification of the presence of natural resources in a country.  
The assumption that corrupt practices are a part of the Latin American political culture 
(Moreno, 2003) might be correct. The baggage the present democratic regimes carry from 
former less-democratic regimes can help explain why it is so difficult to fight the widespread 
corruption in the region. However, the results shows that there is a significant (p< .01) effect 
(b = 0.25) of corruption on citizens satisfaction with democracy. Considering the placement 
of the countries on the corruption perception index (0 is highly corrupt and 10 is very ‘clean’) 
the positive effect in the analysis indicates that the respondents in countries that are perceived 
‘clean’ in terms of corruption tend to be more satisfied with democracy. Consequently, the 
respondents in countries with more corruption are less satisfied. This supports the hypothesis 
H7, that corruption is detrimental to citizens’ satisfaction with democracy.  
There are some challenges to the operationalization of the corruption variable. Corruption was 
operationalized by the country score on Transparency International`s Corruption Perception 
Index (see chapter 3, part 3.3.4). The intended result of the index is to estimate the extent of 
corruption in the world and compare the differences from one year to the next, by giving each 
country a final score. However, as specified in chapter three, the index is still based on what 
people think about corruption in their country, and is not—nor is it presented by Transparency 
International to be—the actual levels of corruption. Other similar indices (e.g. by the World 
Bank) use the same methodological approach to estimate corruption.  
Some scholars will argue that the index is a relative ‘objective’ estimate of the incidence of 
corruption in a country, although survey based (Kotzian 2010:28). Others find that the ranking 
of the countries simplify a complex phenomenon far too much (Søreide 2006:8). This is based 
on the argument that there is no reason to expect that the countries with a perceived high level 
of corruption are indeed the most corrupt countries. “The unreliability of the Corruption 
Perception Index as an indicator for actual extents of corruption implies that countries can be 
perceived as less or more corrupt than they actually are” (Søreide 2006:7). Following this 
reasoning, it can be difficult to make any generalizations about how the corruption levels in 
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the Latin American countries actually affect citizens’ attitudes towards democracy, based on 
the operationalization of the variable in this thesis.  
Anyhow, the observation that low corruption levels in country have a positive effect on 
citizens’ attitudes towards democracy was as expected. The results indicate that increased 
transparency in economic and political processes could contribute to higher levels of 
satisfaction with democracy in the Latin American countries, and eventually help clear the 
image of Latin America as being a region with lenience towards corrupt practices.  
4.3 A standard OLS regression approach 
I ran my variables through a standard OLS regression including dummy-coded country, to 
compare the results from the multilevel model to those of a one-level model. The country-
level variables will hereunder be called contextual variables as the standard OLS regression 
does not separate between level-1 and level-2 units. 
4.3.1 OLS regression: Variance analysis 
The individual-level variables were added to the model in the same order as in the multilevel 
model: The first model includes the control variables sex and age, model 2 adds the variables 
winner/loser status, perception of economy and political interest, and model 3 adds trust in 
democratic institutions and perception of income distribution. Model 3 includes all the 
individual-level variables.  
The contextual variables and the country dummies are overlapping and will be estimated in 
two different models, model 4A: context and model 4B: country. Model 4A adds the control 
variable density, and the remaining contextual variables oil production and corruption to 
model 3. Model 4B adds the dummy-coded country variables to model 3, instead of the 
contextual variables.  
Uruguay was chosen as the land of reference. This is because Uruguay has most years on the 
top of the list of mean satisfaction with democracy in a long-term perspective, and is the 
country with the absolute best outcome in the survey poll of 2009.  
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Table 4.1: A summary of the OLS regression model, variance analysis 
Model  R R Square 
R Square 
Change 
1 .03 (33.11) .00 .00 
2 .38 (30.69) .14 .14 
3 .47 (29.21) .22 .08 
4A context .49 (28.91) .24 .02 
4B country .50 (28.65) .25 .03 
(Std. Error in parenthesis, all estimates significant (p< .01). Source: Latinobarometro 2009). 
The table shows R = .49 for model 4A, and R = .50 for model 4B. This means moderate to 
relatively strong correlation between measured and predicted satisfaction with democracy for 
both models. The statistically explained variance (R Square) for model 2 (R
2
 = .14) shows 
that the winner/loser status, perception of economy and political interest explain 
approximately 14 % of the variance in the dependent variable, when added first.  
The individual-level variables combined (model 3) explain more of the variance in 
satisfaction with democracy (22%
46
), than the contextual variables in model 4A and the 
country variables in model 4B (2% and 3% respectively
47
). We know from the ICC model in 
the multilevel analysis that the between-country variation account for approximately 10 % of 
the variance in satisfaction with democracy (see model 1, Table 4.0). In model 4B country, the 
unique contribution from the country variable is 3%, as a consequence of adding the other 
individual-level variables first. 
Under ‘experiences and expectations’ in chapter two, I insinuated that I expected the variables 
measuring trust in democratic institutions and perception of income distribution to be 
particularly important predictors of satisfaction with democracy in Latin America. In the 
following table (4.2), I have therefore made two versions of the variance analysis of the OLS 
regression presented in table 4.1. This is to find the unique contribution of the effect of the 
trust and income variables.   
                                                 
46
 R Square model 2+ 3 (.22)  
47
 R Square change (.02) for the contextual variables (model 4A) and R Square change (.03) for the 
country variables (model 4B). 
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Table 4.2: A comparison of the unique contribution of the effect of the variables deducted from previous 
research (winner/loser, economy and interest), to the remaining individual-level variables (trust and income).  
(A) 
Model  
R R Square 
R Square 
Change 
 (B) 
Model  
R R Square 
R Square 
Change 
2.1 .38 (30.69) .14 .14  2.2 .42 (30.03) .18 .18 
3 .47 (29.21) .22 .08  3 .47 (29.21) .22 .04 
(Std. Error in parenthesis, all estimates significant (p< .01).  Source: Latinobarometro 2009. Model 1, measuring 
the effect of the control variables sex and age is identical to model 1 in table 4.1 and is left out of this 
illustration).  
 
Model 2.1 is identical to model 2 in table 4.1, measuring the unique contribution of the effect 
of the variables winner/loser, economy and interest. Model 2.2 on the other hand, adds the 
variables trust and income first of the independent variables. Model 3 still includes all the 
individual-level controls and variables. The table 4.2 shows R
2
 change from (A) model 2.1 to 
model 3, and (B) from model 2.2 to model 3. 
The R square change from model 2.1 to model 3 is .08. Compared to the R square change 
from model 2.2 to model 3, which is .04, this indicates that the unique contribution of the 
effect of the variables trust and income is larger than the unique contribution from the 
variables winner/loser, economy and interest. Trust in democratic institutions and perception 
of income distribution explains approximately 18 % of the variance in satisfaction with 
democracy when added first. This confirms that trust in democratic institutions and perception 
of income distribution explain more of the variance in the dependent variable, than the 
variables deducted from previous research on satisfaction with democracy in Europe. 
4.3.2 Multilevel model versus OLS regression 
To confirm or invalidate the expectation that the multilevel model is the appropriate for this 
investigation, a simpler model was applied for comparison. Table 4.3 displays the coefficients 
from the OLS regression along with the coefficients from the multilevel analysis: 
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Table 4.3 Coefficients from the OLS regression model 4A context, compared to the results from the multilevel 
analysis, model 5 (from table 4.0). 
 OLS regression Multilevel regression 
 
B 
Std.  
Error    
Beta B 
Std.  
Error 
Beta 
(Constant) 32.35** .83   30.72** 3.72   
sex -.58 .41 -.01 -.35 .41  
age .35* .12 .02 .29* .12  
winner/loser 6.28** .48 .08 5.74** .49 .06 
economy 6.68** .25 .19 6.26** .47 .19 
interest .73** .16 .03 .71** .16 .03 
trust 7.27** .24 .22 6,79** .46 .20 
income 4.88** .20 .16 4.51** .35 .14 
density .03** .00 .06 .03 .02  
oil 1.45** .20 .05 1.65 1.06  
CPI .21** .02 .09 .25** .08 .11 
(*sig< .05, **sig< .01, Source Latinobarometro 2009) 
 
The results in the OLS regression are similar to those we were given by the multilevel model 
approach. The control variable sex is not significant, but all remaining variables, both the 
individual-level and the contextual, are statistically significant (p< .01). The standardized 
coefficients tell us that the effects of trust in democratic institutions, perception of economic 
situation and perception of income distribution, contribute to the highest increase in 
satisfaction with democracy.  
All the individual-level and contextual-level variables have a significant (p< .01) positive 
effect on satisfaction with democracy. So does the effect of oil, the variable measuring oil 
production. In the multilevel model the effect of oil production did not turn out significant. 
However, the results from a standard OLS regression model confirm the hypothesis H6’, that 
an abundance of natural resources have a positive effect on satisfaction with democracy. The 
results regarding oil production from the OLS regression model would thus lead to a different 
interpretation than that of the results from the multilevel model. The results from the OLS 
regression also show statistical association between the effect of the control variable density 
and satisfaction with democracy, which was not detected in the multilevel model.  
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This illustrates the difference between a one-level regression analysis, such as the standard 
OLS regression and the multilevel analysis. A one-level analysis places the characteristics of 
the level-2 units on equal terms as the characteristics of the level-one units. The effects of the 
level-2 variables turn out significant because the test is based on all the level-1 units—20204 
respondents— in the survey. This is not correct. The significance of level-2 variables should 
be tested based on number of level-2 units—18 countries—which would give a more correct 
measure. The standard errors of the estimates are generally higher in multilevel analysis. This 
is because the observations are clustered and to some degree duplications of each other 
(Steenbergen and Jones 2002:220), meaning that the number of units—statistically 
speaking—are fewer than the actual number of level-1 units in the data. The clustering of the 
observations cause an underrating of the standard error of the parameter estimates in OLS 
regression. The assumption that the units are independent when they in fact are nested, can 
lead to an interpretation of results as statistically significant, when they are not. The 
multilevel approach is thus more accurate when using nested data. 
 
4.3.3 OLS regression: Interaction between independent variables 
and countries? 
Interaction between the origin of the respondents and their responses to the questions in the 
survey is present if the effect of the individual-level variables varies depending on the 
country. The multilevel model treats the countries in the investigation as a random sample of 
countries. If there is a significant interaction between the independent variables and the 
countries, the OLS regression will also tell us in which countries the interaction is detected. 
As the multilevel analysis revealed that the effects of the variables measuring perception of 
economic situation, trust in democratic institutions and winner/loser status (model 5 and 6, 
Table 4.0), it is expected that the interaction variables regarding these variables will be 
significant in the OLS analysis as well. Table 4.4 shows an excerpt of the results from the 
interaction analysis:   
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Table 4.4: Coefficients from the OLS regression model 4B country, with the interaction variables included
48
.  
 B Std. Error 
(Constant) 60.32** 1.31 
sex -.30 .41 
age .27* .12 
winner/loser 5.32** 1.92 
economy 2.93* 1.24 
interest -.50 .60 
trust 8.17** .97 
income 3.35** .83 
(Country) **  
(*sig< .05, **sig< .01, Source Latinobarometro 2009) 
Uruguay is still the country of reference, being the country with the absolute highest mean 
satisfaction with democracy in 2009. The coefficients for dummy-coded country are all 
significant, and will be further commented on in the following: 
The covariance estimate for being interested in politics did not turn out significant in the 
explorative model 6 of the multilevel analysis (see part 4.1.2 above). Interestingly enough, the 
interaction variable between the effect of political interest on respondents’ satisfaction with 
democracy and countries, still turned out significant for three of the 18 countries in the 
interaction analysis (Bolivia, El Salvador and Guatemala).  
We can see a similar tendency for the variable measuring how fair the respondents find the 
income distribution in their country. Comparatively, the random effect of this variable was not 
significant in the multilevel model (model 5, Table 4.0). Anyhow, the interaction variable 
between the effect of income distribution and countries is statistically significant (p< .01). 
The interaction analysis shows a positive correlation of the effect of perception of income 
distribution on satisfaction with democracy for respondents from Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Paraguay and Venezuela. 
There was significant interaction between the effect of other independent variables and 
countries as well. The effect of having a winner/loser status on satisfaction with democracy is 
statistically significant in Bolivia, Chile, Honduras and Peru. The most positive relation was 
                                                 
48
 See the complete interaction analysis (Appendix A, table 4.5) for details. 
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detected for Bolivia, which indicates that the effect of being a winner in Bolivia decreases the 
gap between Bolivia and Uruguay in citizens’ satisfaction with democracy.  
In Honduras we were able to detect the absolute strongest negative relation. The effect  
(b = - 27.29) 
 
of being a winner or loser on satisfaction with democracy for respondents from 
Honduras is far more negative compared to the effect of this variable on satisfaction with 
democracy in Uruguay. Consequently, the effect of the winner/loser variable increases the gap 
between Honduras and Uruguay even further, in regards to citizens’ satisfaction with 
democracy. The political crisis in Honduras culminated with the coup d’état in June 2009. 
The interviews for the data used in this thesis were conducted prior to the new presidential 
election that took place in November 2009. It is therefore likely to expect that this could have 
contributed to the difficulty of the Honduran respondents to identify with any ‘winner’ of the 
electoral contest, when the elected president had been ousted by a military coup initiative.  
The effect of trust in democratic institutions on respondents’ satisfaction with democracy was 
significant in Bolivia, El Salvador and Guatemala. This effect was negative, indicating that 
the effect of trust in democratic institutions increases the gap between these three countries 
and Uruguay, in regards to satisfaction with democracy. In countries where citizens display 
low levels of trust in institutions, low levels of satisfaction can be a sign of future democratic 
difficulty or instability (Lagos 2001:141). Both El Salvador and Bolivia had more satisfied 
than dissatisfied respondents in the survey poll of 2009 (see chapter 2, part 2.1.1.). Guatemala 
on the other hand was amongst the bottom three countries in regards to mean satisfaction with 
democracy. In formulating a hypothesis on the legitimacy of the political system and trust in 
democratic institutions in chapter 2 (part 2.3.1), I used Guatemala as an example of a Latin 
American country in which political institutions have been an ‘empty shell’, present only to 
attend to the needs of the authorities. This implies that the inability—or disinterest—to 
establish legitimate political institutions can present an obstacle for attitudes towards 
democracy evolving in a positive manner. In the long run this can pose a threat to the public 
support for the democratic regime.  
The effect of perception of economic situation on citizens’ satisfaction with democracy was 
statistically significant in more than half of the countries in the investigation
49
. The effect was 
positive, meaning that it contributes to a reduction of the gap between these countries and 
Uruguay, in regards to satisfaction with democracy.  
                                                 
49 The countries were Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, 
Venezuela and the Dominican Republic. 
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Since the variables measuring political interest and perception of income distribution were not 
expected to vary between the countries
50
, the regression analysis with the interaction variables 
has added another dimension of interpretation to the explanation.  
In testing the significance of the interaction between the effect of the variables and the 
countries, 111 separate analyses were completed (see Appendix A, table 4.5). The results gave 
34 statistically significant effects on a 1 % level, and 13 additional significant effects on a 5 % 
level. It is thus no reason to suspect a ‘false positive’ outcome (type I error). 
The results from both the multilevel analysis and the OLS regression interaction analysis 
contribute in explaining the factors of importance for citizens’ satisfaction with democracy in 
2009.  
                                                 
50
 Political interest was not expected to vary based on my reasoning, which was confirmed by the 
results in the explorative model 6 (table 4.0). The perception of income distribution was expected to 
vary based on my reasoning, but this was invalidated by the insignificant variance component of this 
variable in model 5, table 4.0. 
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5 From Satisfaction to Support: 
Concluding remarks 
In the introduction of this thesis, I argued that support for democracy is indispensable for the 
survival of democracy as the ruling regime. Satisfaction with democracy is important for 
generating support. The majority—over 60%—of the population in Latin America would say 
that democracy is preferable to any other kind of government, when asked in an opinion 
survey. We still saw that close to half of the respondents that would prefer democratic rule are 
so called ‘genuine proven democrats’. This means that they would support democratic rule, 
even if they are not satisfied with what goes under the ‘label’ of democracy in their country.  
This thesis asked which factors that can influence citizens’ satisfaction with democracy, to see 
which conditions that could be favorable or detrimental in developing attitudes towards 
democracy. Both the multilevel analysis and the one-level interaction analysis displayed that 
the effect of several of the factors vary between the countries in the region. This confirms that 
people are influenced by the particular political context to which they are exposed. Based on 
individual-level and country-level evidence from eighteen Latin American countries, I found 
that trust in democratic institutions is the most determining factor of respondents’ satisfaction 
with democracy in Latin America. This finding diverges from the results from previous 
research on satisfaction with democracy in Europe, where the effect of trust turned out vague 
or ambiguous.  
Almost equally important for democratic attitudes in Latin America, is the respondents’ 
perception of the economic situation in their country. Other attitudinal differences, such as 
political interest and party preference also affect citizens’ satisfaction with democracy in 
Latin America. These results are consistent with results from previous research on satisfaction 
with democracy in Europe. This reinforces the idea that there are certain ‘universal’ 
determinants of citizens’ satisfaction with democracy. The perception of economic prosperity 
and being a ‘winner’ in electoral contests appears to be two such factors.  
Further, this investigation shows that there are yet other factors of particular importance for 
citizens’ satisfaction with democracy in Latin America. The effect of income distribution 
appears to be a direct consequence of the extremely unjust income situation in Latin America. 
The citizens that find the income distribution in their country to be somewhat fair are clearly 
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more satisfied with what goes under the label of democracy in their country. Corruption is 
also fundamental in shaping the public opinion on democracy in Latin America. Previous 
research suggests that there is a wide cultural basis for the justification of corruption in Latin 
America (Moreno, 2003). If the beneficiaries of corrupt practices are amongst the political or 
economic elites, eliminating the corrupt elements can be a slow process. Anyhow, the results 
from this thesis display a very significant proof of the negative impact corruption has on 
citizens’ satisfaction with democracy in Latin America.  
The great economic inequalities and the battle against corruption are tremendous challenges 
for Latin America. These factors are typical examples of the kinds of challenges presented in 
developing parts of the world. Although democracy may be the type of regime best equipped 
to meet these challenges in the long run, the survival of the regime is still dependent on public 
support. Social equality and transparency in political processes can be seen as two such 
fundamental aspects of attaining support for a democratic regime. If these demands go 
unattended for longer periods of time, this can increase the chances of dissatisfaction with 
democracy also for citizens that consider themselves ‘democrats’.  Dissatisfaction over time 
might deteriorate the public support for the democratic regime and be a threat to the survival 
of democracy in Latin America, and thus other regions with brief democratic traditions. 
It is evident that the Latin Americans are marked by their past. This thesis has referred to 
characteristics such as distrust and acceptance of corrupt practices as a part of the ‘political 
culture’ of Latin America. When comparing Latin America to other regions such as Europe, 
the citizens are less satisfied with democracy. But when comparing the Latin America of 
today to the Latin America of the previous decades, the citizens are more satisfied with 
democracy than before. This can indicate a maturing of democracy in the region. The 
important question is whether or not this trend will lead to increased levels of support for 
democracy in the years to come. 
5.1 Recommendation for further research 
As mentioned in the introduction, the political landscape of Latin America is in constant 
motion. There have been changes since the 2009 survey poll was conducted, the data utilized 
for this investigation. It would be interesting to pursue the investigation over the following 
years to see if for example the recent economic growth and political prosperity of Brazil has 
led to an increase in citizens’ satisfaction with democracy. Brazil was in 2011 the world’s 
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seventh wealthiest country, with stable economic growth, relatively low inflation rates and 
improvements in social well-being (World Bank). With a reference to the findings in this 
investigation, it is likely that these factors would continuously increase the Brazilians 
satisfaction with democracy. 
There are certain factors that this thesis did not focus on that could also be expected to 
influence citizens’ attitudes towards democracy. The escalation of drug-related crimes and 
impunity for former presidents—or high ranked politicians—that have violated their positions 
can be two examples of additional factors that challenge the respondents’ satisfaction with 
democracy in Latin America. I will leave it up to future investigators to see how drug-related 
crime and impunity could lead to dissatisfaction with democracy and maybe be parts of the 
explanation to why such a large percentage of the ‘democrats’ in Latin America still not feel 
satisfied with the democracy in their country.  
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Appendix A: Table 4.5 
 
Table 4.5: Results from the analysis of interaction between the independent variables and the country variables 
(complete) 
Parameter B 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
Intercept 60.32 1.31 .00 
sex -.30 .41 .46 
age .27 .12 .03 
Winner/loser 5.32 1.92 .01 
economy 2.93 1.24 .02 
interest -.50 .60 .40 
trust 8.17 .97 .00 
income 3.35 .83 .00 
Argentina -13.78 1.66 .00 
Bolivia -19.72 1.65 .00 
Brazil -17.43 1.65 .00 
Colombia -16.86 1.53 .00 
Costa Rica -7.17 1.72 .00 
Chile -13.14 1.61 .00 
Ecuador -21.28 1.56 .00 
El Salvador -7.21 1.71 .00 
Guatemala -14.92 1.62 .00 
Honduras -17.12 1.72 .00 
Mexico -21.50 1.57 .00 
Nicaragua -17.85 1.81 .00 
Panama -4.55 1.71 .01 
Paraguay -23.86 1.51 .00 
Peru -22.94 1.61 .00 
Venezuela -14.20 1.57 .00 
Dominican Republic -7.83 1.71 .00 
Uruguay . . . 
 
(Continues on the following page) 
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Argentina * winner -5.27 3.06 .09 
Bolivia * winner 9.56 2.72 .00 
Brazil * winner -3.07 2.57 .23 
Colombia * winner 4.18 2.81 .14 
Costa Rica * winner 5.23 2.75 .06 
Chile * winner 5.77 2.83 .04 
Ecuador * winner 2.68 2.78 .33 
El Salvador * winner -.06 2.78 .98 
Guatemala * winner 3.01 3.41 .38 
Honduras * winner -10.17 2.75 .00 
Mexico * winner -.23 3.09 .94 
Nicaragua * winner 5.05 3.17 .11 
Panama * winner -2.65 2.70 .33 
Paraguay * winner 2.77 2.96 .35 
Peru * winner 8.79 4.05 .03 
Venezuela * winner -4.85 2.65 .07 
Dominican R.* winner -1.75 2.78 .53 
Argentina * economy 4.01 1.65 .02 
Bolivia * economy 5.90 1.70 .00 
Brazil * economy 5.48 1.55 .00 
Colombia * economy 4.30 1.63 .01 
Costa Rica * economy 3.28 1.64 .05 
Chile * economy 3.23 1.74 .06 
Ecuador * economy 4.02 1.63 .01 
El Salvador * economy .79 1.63 .63 
Guatemala * economy 3.00 1.64 .07 
Honduras * economy .31 1.60 .85 
Mexico * economy 2.82 1.62 .08 
Nicaragua * economy 1.53 1.69 .37 
Panama * economy 2.49 1.66 .13 
Paraguay * economy 3.67 1.59 .02 
Peru * economy 3.41 1.73 .05 
Venezuela * economy 6.98 1.71 .00 
Dominican R.* economy 3.04 1.55 .05 
Argentina * interest 1.10 .87 .21 
Bolivia * interest 2.55 .87 .00 
Brazil * interest .90 .87 .30 
Colombia * interest .89 .88 .31 
Costa Rica * interest 1.08 .93 .24 
Chile * interest .80 .92 .38 
Ecuador * interest 1.18 .92 .20 
El Salvador * interest 1.22 .93 .19 
Guatemala * interest 2.53 .93 .01 
Honduras * interest 2.49 .88 .01 
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Mexico * interest .60 .88 .50 
Nicaragua * interest .33 .99 .74 
Panama * interest 1.37 .88 .12 
Paraguay * interest 1.35 .84 .11 
Peru * interest .44 .89 .63 
Venezuela * interest .87 .86 .31 
Dominican R.* interest 1.47 .89 .10 
Uruguay * interest . . . 
Argentina * trust 1.17 1.45 .42 
Bolivia * trust -6.44 1.47 .00 
Brazil * trust -1.97 1.34 .14 
Colombia * trust -1.11 1.34 .41 
Costa Rica * trust -2.30 1.47 .12 
Chile * trust .32 1.38 .82 
Ecuador * trust -2.70 1.46 .07 
El Salvador * trust -3.38 1.40 .02 
Guatemala * trust -4.08 1.47 .01 
Honduras * trust -1.12 1.36 .41 
Mexico * trust .54 1.40 .70 
Nicaragua * trust -2.67 1.41 .06 
Panama * trust -2.37 1.40 .09 
Paraguay * trust -2.09 1.37 .13 
Peru * trust -.83 1.52 .59 
Venezuela * trust 2.67 1.37 .05 
Dominican R.* trust -2.67 1.41 .06 
Argentina * income -.73 1.43 .61 
Bolivia * income 2.07 1.17 .08 
Brazil * income .76 1.19 .53 
Colombia * income .65 1.17 .58 
Costa Rica * income 1.13 1.17 .34 
Chile * income .24 1.20 .84 
Ecuador * income .26 1.16 .82 
El Salvador * income .91 1.20 .45 
Guatemala * income 1.18 1.28 .36 
Honduras * income 1.44 1.17 .22 
Mexico * income 2.59 1.23 .04 
Nicaragua * income 2.94 1.23 .02 
Panama * income -1.17 1.18 .32 
Paraguay * income 3.25 1.17 .01 
Peru * income -.97 1.32 .46 
Venezuela * income 3.18 1.21 .01 
Dominican R.* income 1.00 1.16 .39 
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Appendix B: Technical information 
 
The specific wording in the questions used as independent variables are as follows: 
Economic situation: 
Q3ST.A In general, how would you describe the country’s present economic 
situation? Would you say it is...? (Very good, good, about average, bad, 
very bad, don`t know, no answer) 
 
Q3ST.A ¿Cómo calificaría en general la situación económica actual del país? 
Diría Ud. que es...(Muy Buena, Buena, Regular, Mala, Muy Mala, No Sabe, No 
responde) 
 
Economic inequalities: 
Q14ST. How fair you think that income distribution is in (country)?  
(Very fair, fair, unfair, very unfair, don`t know, no answer) 
 
Q14ST. ¿Cuán justa cree Ud. que es la distribución del ingreso en 
(país)?(Muy justa, Justa, Injusta, Muy Injusta, No sabe, No responde) 
 
Legitimacy of political institutions and trust: 
Q26ST. Please look at this card and tell me, how much trust you have in 
each of the following groups, institutions or persons: a lot (1), some (2), 
a little (3) or no trust (4)? (Don`t know (8), No answer (0)). 
 
Q26ST.A. National Congress/ 
Parliament...................1 2 3 4 8 0 
Q26ST.B. Judiciary...........1 2 3 4 8 0 
Q26ST.C. Political parties...1 2 3 4 8 0 
Q26ST.D. Armed forces........1 2 3 4 8 0 
Q26ST.E. Public Admin........1 2 3 4 8 0 
Q26ST.F. Local government....1 2 3 4 8 0 
Q26ST. Por favor, mire esta tarjeta y dígame, para cada uno de los grupos, 
instituciones o personas mencionadas en la lista ¿cuánta confianza tiene 
usted en ellas: mucha(1), 
algo(2), poca(3) o ninguna(4) confianza en...? (No sabe (8), No responde 
(0)). 
 
P26ST.A El Congreso Nacional/Parlamento ......1 2 3 4 8 0 
P26ST.B El Poder Judicial 1 2 3 4 8 0 
P26ST.C Los partidos políticos ................1 2 3 4 8 0 
P26ST.D Las Fuerzas Armadas. .................1 2 3 4 8 0 
P26ST.E La administración pública ..................1 2 3 4 8 0 
P26ST.F Los Municipios/gobierno local ...........1 2 3 4 8 0 
 
Interest and involvement in politics: 
Q32ST. How interested are you in politics? (Very interested, some interest, 
little interest, not at all interested, don`t know, no answer) 
 
Q32ST. ¿Cuán interesado está Ud. en la política? (Muy interesado, algo 
interesado, poco interesado, nada interesado, No sabe, No responde) 
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The winner/loser variable is based on an observation of whether or not the party preference 
correspond to party in government or not (see chapter 3, part 3.3.3) 
Technical information about the 2009 poll of the Latinobarometro: 
Country Methodology 
Number 
of cases 
(N) 
Margin of 
Error 
Total  
representativ
eness of 
country % 
Argentina Modified probability sampling. Probabilistic in three stages, 
by quota in the final stage 
1200 +/- 2.8 % 99 % 
Bolivia Modified probability sampling. Probabilistic in three stages, 
by quota in the final stage 
1200 +/- 2.8 % 100 % 
Brazil Modified probability sampling. Probabilistic in three stages, 
by quota in the final stage 
1204 +/- 2.8 % 100 % 
Chile Probability sampling, three stages 1200 +/- 2.8 % 100 % 
Colombia Modified probability sampling. Conglomerates, stratified and 
multi-stage 
1200 +/- 3.2 % 99.9 % 
Costa Rica Modified probability sampling. Probabilistic in three stages, 
by quota in the final stage 
1000 +/- 3.1 % 100 % 
Ecuador Modified probability sampling. Probabilistic in three stages, 
by quota in the final stage 
1200 +/- 2.8 % 100 % 
El Salvador Modified probability sampling. Probabilistic in three stages, 
by quota in the final stage 
1000 +/- 3.1 % 100 % 
Guatemala Modified probability sampling. Probabilistic in three stages, 
by quota in the final stage 
1000 +/- 3.1 % 100 % 
Honduras Modified probability sampling. Probabilistic in three stages, 
by quota in the final stage 
1000 +/- 3.1 % 100 % 
Mexico Modified probability sampling. Probabilistic in two stages, by 
quota in the final stage 
1200 +/- 2.8 % 100 % 
Nicaragua Modified probability sampling. Probabilistic in three stages, 
by quota in the final stage 
1000 +/- 3.1 % 100 % 
Panama Modified probability sampling. Probabilistic in three stages, 
by quota in the final stage 
1000 +/- 3.1 % 99.2 % 
Paraguay Modified probability sampling. In urban areas: probabilistic 
in four stages, by quota in the final stage In rural areas: 
probabilistic in three stages, by quota in the final stage 
1200 +/- 2.8 % 100 % 
Peru Modified probability sampling. Probabilistic in three stages, 
by quota in the final stage 
1200 +/- 2.8 % 100 % 
Dominican 
Republic 
Modified probability sampling. Probabilistic in three stages, 
by quota in the final stage 
1000 +/- 3.1 % 100 % 
Uruguay Modified probability sampling. Probabilistic in three stages, 
by quota in the final stage 
1200 +/- 2.8 % 100 % 
Venezuela Probability sampling, four stages 1200 +/- 2.8 % 93.2 % 
(Source: Latinobarometro, 2009) 
 
